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NOTES
A NovEL EXTENSION OF "FRIGHT" LIABILITY *
THE BOUNDARIES Of "fright" liability have slowly expanded as judicial
fear of a flurry of fabricated suits has given way to a desire to compensate
the injured. Evidentiary difficulties formerly forced courts arbitrarily to
deny recovery for speculative internal injuries caused by emotional disturb-
ance unless the defendant's negligent act also produced contemporaneous
physical impact.' Soon the medical profession's increased familiarity with
injuries emotionally produced furnished relatively reliable means of detect-
ing spurious claims. 2 Though this medical progress induced courts to be
more lenient toward fright plaintiffs, the judicial mind still feared fabrica-
tion and sought to forestall this evil by postulating arbitrary limits of liabil-
ity. These arbitrary confines ,have been gradually extended. Liberal decisions
have so altered the nature of the contemporaneous impact required that recov-
ery has seldom been barred by a court's inability to find the necessary "blow." 3
More recently even the requirement of a technical impact has been removed
by some courts and liability extended to those cases where a negligent act,
though unaccompanied by physical contact, results in injuries caused by
plaintiff's fear for .his personal safety.4 Some American courts have gone
* Rasmussen v. Benson, 280 N. W. 890 (Neb. Sup. Ct., 1938).
1. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 110, 45 N. E. 354, 355 (1896) ; Spade
v. Lynn & B. R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 288, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) ;" Ewing v. P.C. & St. L
Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 340 (1892). This rule was formerly adhered to in the majority
of states, but it has gradually been forsaken by most jurisdictions. Note (1935) 93
A. L. R. 402; Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without
Impact (1902) 50 Am. L. REG. (O. S.) 141; Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in New
York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rv.
409, n. 2.
2. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 Mica. L Rsv.
497.
3. Porter v. Delaware L. & V. R. R., 73 N. J. Law 405, 63 At. 860 (1906) (im-
pact requirement satisfied by something striking plaintiff's neck and dust getting in her
eyes) ; Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931) (decedent fainted and
fell directly after accident thereby satisfying requirement); Mitnick v. W halen Bros.,
Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 At. 414 (1932); see Bohlen and Polikoff, Mpra note 1, at 409.
There has been no uniformity in this extension of liability. Although most jurisdictions
have either discarded the contemporaneous impact restriction or have found such impact
more readily, other jurisdictions maintain it in all its original dignity. Where an officer
negligently shot plaintiff's husband, who brushed plaintiff as he fell, it was held there wvas
not a sufficient impact to allow recovery for injuries resulting from the shock. State
ex rel. Renz v. Dickens, 95 S. AV. (2d) 847 (Mo. Civ. App., 1936).
4. RESTATEENr, TORTS (1934) § 436 (2). No opinion is offered as to cases vwhere
emotional disturbance is caused by plight of third person. See Comment e, Caveat. In
these jurisdictions when emotional disturbance was caused by fear for self and another,
recovery is only allowed on basis of fear for personal safety. Frazee '.. Western Dairy
Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935) (charge upheld stating no recovery
for "fright or fear to some person other than to plaintiff") ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co.,
131 N. C. 536, 42 S. E. 983 (1902) (fear for self and child from defendant's blasting
on adjacent property).
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still further in this extension of liability allowing recovery even though the
emotionally induced injury resulted from fear for the safety of a third per-
son and not of self. To come within the ambit of these cases, however, the
plaintiff himself must have been within the zone of apprehensible physical
harm5 and the endangered third person must be a member of the plaintiff's
family.6 A further arbitrary requirement exists in the mandate that the fear
be for self or family and not for property.
7
When the tortious act is willful, the judiciary's fear of false suits has been
overcome by a desire to hold the defendant responsible for the direct con-
sequences of his intentional wrong, and courts have withdrawn much of the
ar'bitrary protection granted a defendant when his act is negligent." Thus
when a third person is injured or endangered by defendant's willful act,
thereby causing plaintiff fear for the other's safety, recovery has generally
been allowed, regardless of plaintiff's position within or without the zone of
foreseeable harm;9 and the requirement that the third person be a member
5. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912), cert. denied, 177
Ala. 672, 58 So. 1038 (1912); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933).
Where the requirement of contemporaneous impact is retained in modified form, the
fear may be for family members and not self, as long as plaintiff is within the zone of
foreseeable harm. Cohen v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39
(1st Dep't 1914) ; cf. Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S. 8. 28 (1916). Recov-
ery in all jurisdictions has been denied where defendant's negligence caused shock to a
plaintiff outside the zone of peril. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497
(1935) (mother, sitting at window, saw daughter killed crossing street) ; Nuckles v.
Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775 (1927) (plaintiff not in
personal peril saw his son run over) ; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
App. 374, 56 N. E. 917 (1900) (plaintiff on railroad platform saw daughter caught in
train door and dragged along platform) ; cf. Curry v. Journal Publishing Co., 41 N. M.
318, 68 P. (2d) 168 (1937). The English courts have allowed recovery where plaintiff
was not within the zone of peril. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. [1925] 1 K. B. 141. See
Comment (1937) 26 GO. L. J. 144.
6. Since in the great majority of cases the third person has been within the fauity
relation, the courts have not been forced to determine recovery upon this point. The
requirement, however, is continually reiterated. See (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 70,
71, n. 9.
7. See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 608, 258 N. W. 497, 499 (1935);
Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K. B. 669. Where fear for loss of property and fear
for self or member of family have been alleged, whenever recovery has been allowed it
has been on the basis of fear for self or relative, and never based on fear for property.
Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N. C. 211, 193 S. E. 31 (1937) ; Green
v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688 (1909).
8. Generally the requirement of contemporaneous impact has not been imposed.
Atlanta Hub Co., Inc. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171 S. E. 470 (1933) ; Engle v. Sun-
mons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906). Contra: Hutchinson v. Stern, 115 App. Div.
791, 101 N. Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't 1906); McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W.
742 (1912). Even in those cases of willful tort, recovery is limited by principles of legal
causation. Sanderson v. No. Pacific Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542 (1902). See Hal.
len, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock (1933) 19 VA. L.
Rav. 253.
9. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. 1068 (1902); Alabama Fuel & Iron
Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va.
124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924).
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of the plaintiff's family has not been rigidly enforced. 10 Whether the de-
fendant's act be willful or negligent the courts have maintained certain fur-
ther restrictions. It has always been required that the emotional disturbance
be nearly contemporaneous with the defendant's act."' This question seldom
furnishes difficulty, because in almost all cases the wrongful act has pro-
duced an immediate shock. In addition, the emotional distress is required to
result in a manifest injury. Mfere nervousness and inability to sleep are not
sufficient.12 Though all these limitations on fright liability are highly arbitrary,
the courts seem to feel that their maintenance is desirable since they roughly
include within their bounds those classes of claimants most likely to prove
bona fide and exclude those whose claims are most likely to be spurious.
A recent Nebraska case"3 seems to overstep even these newly extended
frontiers of liability. Benson, forgetting that he had treated a sack of bran
with arsenic for poisoning grasshoppers, sold the bran to Rasmussen, a dairy-
man, as feed for live stock. Rasmussen fed the bran to his cows and the next
morning milked and made deliveries to his customers. Later in the forenoon,
five cows died and the other five were rendered unfit for further use in the
dairy. Fearing arsenious poisoning of his customers, Rasmussen notified
them as soon as possible of the impurities the milk might contain. As a result
of the mental and nervous shock caused by the poisoning of his cows, the loss
of his dairy business and fear for the lives of his customers, the dairyman lost
his health and died nine months after the sale. Decedent's wife, as adminis-
tratrix of the estate, brought suit not only for the loss of the cows and the
dairy business, but also for the death of her husband. A judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed by a five to two decision of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska.
10. Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890) (negro servant); Rogers v.
Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S. IV. 15 (1920) (landlord). Here again cases have seldom
arisen where the third person has not been a member of the plaintiff's family.
11. Clough v. Steen, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 392, 39 P. (2d) 8S9 (1934); ci. Hambrook
v. Stokes Bros., [19251 1 K. B. 141, 152; Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash.
578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935) ; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Lao
of Torts (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1039.
An exception to this rule is furnished by the cases allowing recovery for injuries pro-
duced by mental anguish caused by negligently transmitted telegrams. These cases,
however, form a distinct category, imposing a high degree of care on telegraph com-
panies because they are public utilities. See Note (1931) 72 A. L R. 1203.
12. Colsher v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 19 Tenn. App. 166, 84 S.XV. (2d) 117
(1935). It is the judicial tendency rather than the rule to deny recovery for mental
suffering alone. There are recognized- exceptions, however, where defendant's act .:as
willful and malicious [Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. XV. 25
(1932)], or where the claim is part of a breach of contract [Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v.
Coopwood, 96 S. IV. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906)]. See Note (1928) 56 A. L R. 657.
These exceptions generally are applied to telegraph cases [(1920) 26 R. C. L. 6061,
and to dead body cases [Huntley v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 1C
Cal. App. 201, 280 Pac. 163 (1929); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 12 N.E. (2d) 360
(Ind. Civ. App., 1938)]. Where there is an intentional assault, damages are recoverable
for mental suffering. HA", R, TCRTs (1933) §§ 18-20.
13. Rasmussen v. Benson, 280 N. WV. 890 (Neb. Sup. Ct., 1938).
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The court stated the broad and unqualified rule that "a physical injury
resulting from emotional upset produced by the negligence of another creates
liability in damages."'1 4 No consideration was given the restrictions which
other courts have established in terms of the position of the plaintiff in rela-
tion to the sphere of danger and of the requirement of a family connection
between plaintiff and the endangered person. It is highly improbable, how-
ever, that even Nebraska will extend fright liability in the future to the
full limits of the broad generalization stated in the instant opinion.Y5 Such
an extension would result in unlimited and ruinous liability for all emotional
injuries remotely traceable to the wrongful act in question. It seems more
likely that the doctrine of the instant case will be closely confined to the facts
involved. So considered the case still constitutes a novel extension of fright
liability.' Since the deceased probably was accustomed to drinking his own
milk, he may be said to have been within the scope of apprehensible danger ;11
but certainly fear for his customers cannot be interpreted as fear for himself
or family, and fear for himself or family was not otherwise alleged or
proved.' 8 Consequently, the instant case must be interpreted as broadening
the former criterion of kinship at least to one of business relationship. By
this bold stroke the court has extended the scope of liability predicated upon
a negligent act until its confines closely approach the broad limits of liability
for a shock caused by a willful wrong.
The advisability of a continued extension of the frontiers of fright liability
is questionable. Any line must be arbitrary that is established between a point
where defendant is liable for injuries resulting from emotional disturbance
only when accompanied by contemporaneous impact, and a point where de-
fendant is liable for all possible consequences of his negligent act. But arbi-
trariness is perhaps preferable to the consequences of embracing a broader
rule of liability. The courts in establishing early limits were concerned only
14. Id. at 893.
15. The Nebraska court had previously adopted the rule allowing recovery in fright
cases without requiring contemporaneous physical impact. Hanford v. Omaha & C. B.
St. Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643 (1925) ; Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N. W.
335 (1931).
16. This case might have been founded upon a contractual theory of implied war-
ranty. Where a vendor sells an article that because of some defect is dangerous for the
use for which it was purchased and this condition could have been discovered by the
exercise of reasonable care, the vendor is liable to the vendee in tort for injuries resulting
to him by the use of the article. Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1176, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 343.
Where the resultant injury was pr6duced by emotional disturbance, recoveries have, in
some cases, been allowed. Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc. 835, 211 N. Y. Supp.
582 (2d Dep't 1925); cf. Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N. H. 427, 128 AtI. 343 (1925);
Clark Restaurant Co. v. Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N. E. 196 (1931); Wilson, The
New York Ride as to Nervous Shock (1926) 11 COW,. L. Q. 512.
17. The court cites several medical authorities who state that "arsenic poison may
be communicated through milk." Rasmussen v. Benson, 280 N. W. 890, 892 (Neb.
Sup. Ct., 1938).
18. Id. at 890. Where the emotional disturbance is the result of multiple causes,
it is difficult even for the injured person to determine the precise cause of his shock.
It may well be that fear was produced by danger to himself or his family, thereby bringing
the case within the established limits of liability.
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with thwarting possible avenues of fraud. A new problem was posed as lia-
bility was expanded. The continued extension of liability, allowing recovery
by unimperilled bystanders and those told of the dangerous incident days after
its occurrence, would inflict an unbearable financial burden on defendants.' 0
An analogy is furnished by the limited liability placed upon railroads for
fires negligently caused. To recover plaintiff must be within the zone of fore-
seeable harm which the courts arbitrarily restrict to that neighborhood imme-
diately adjacent to the railroads' right of way. Fire may spread to houses
many miles away, but under ordinary circumstances the railroad will not be
held liable.2 0 A similarly arbitrary limit of liability seems necessary in fright
cases.
The wisdom of the extension of present limits by the instant decision
must ultimately be determined by considerations of public policy. Expansion
of certain concepts of negligence has, perhaps, been prompted by a desire to
shift the risk of loss to the person best able to distribute it by insurance or
price increases. This policy would seem to justify enlarging the liability of
automobile owners, railroads, utilities and other industries; but to be benefi-
cial such an enlargement must come by way of holdings which are narrowed
to the industries in question. Extending the scope of such general concepts
of negligence as that involved in the instant case will shift the loss to the
small uninsured individual as well as to the large scale producer.2 ' The pres-
ent decision relieves a small dairyman only to burden an equally small farmer.
Furthermore, increased fright liability cannot be justified on the ground of
prophylactic value. Susceptibility to emotional disturbance -aries with the
individual and is relatively unpredictable. The ephemeral possibility of such
an emotional injury is not likely to act as a strong deterrent where the more
predictable danger of liability by negligent physical contact has failed.2 In
the final analysis it seems that extended fright liability lacks substantiating
public policy.
The present frontiers, although based upon arbitrary distinctions, need
not result in too great injustice as long as the flexible negligence theories are
adroitly applied by the courts. There is no standardization in negligence con-
cepts. Some few states still apply the formula that if the defendant's act
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to someone, it is negligent and a
defendant is liable for all the consequences proximately caused.2 Here the
19. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 50 HAav. L. Rzv. 725, 735. The ruinous
magnitude extended liability may assume in individual cases is evidenced by a recent
incident. A radio drama which listeners mistakenly interpreted as an authentic news
broadcast of a Martian invasion caused fright and emotional disturbance to thousands
throughout the nation. N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1938, p. 1, col. 4. It would prove disastrous
to hold the broadcasting company liable for all resultant fright injuries.
20. HA RPE, op. cit. supra note 12, at § 197.
21. The majority of defendants in negligence cases arising under the present bounds
of liability have been automobile owners, railroads and blasting companies. Green,
"Fright" Cases (1933) 27 IiL. L. REv. 761, 873. But this affords little consolation to
the small property owner who finds himself burdened with liability.
22. Comment (1929) 29 COL L. REv. 53, 60. Furthermore, extension would have
no relation to defendant's culpability. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. IV.
497 (1935).
23. IiAPR, op. cit. supra note 12, at 14.
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application of fright liability would be considered in the vernacular of proxi-
mate cause.2 4 The great majority of states, however, apply the relational duty
formula. The defendant's act is negligent only if it is reasonably foreseeable
that the act will cause a certain harm to the class of which the plaintiff is a
member, and the defendant is liable to that class for all the direct consequenc-
es of such act. 25 In these jurisdictions fright liability would be studied in
the phraseology of duty to the plaintiff.2 6 In either case, the problem is not
to be determined by some "seemingly automatic formula," but by the flexible
concept of foreseeability which is ultimately for the judge.27 A judicious
manipulation of these theories within the established frontiers of fright lia-
bility would assure justice in unusual cases, and yet avert the dangers inher-
ent in the formulation of too broad a general ru!e.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-PICKETING ORDINANCES :
EVER since the use of the labor injunction has been curtailed by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and its state prototypes,1 there has been an increasing resort
to the sanctions of the criminal law in labor disputes. 2 One phase of this
development has been the enactment by municipalities of a variety of ordi-
nances directed against picketing,3 and even state legislation of similar tenor
has recently been considered.4 This tendency, added to the persistent weaken-
24. State ex rel. Renz v. Dickens, 95 S. W. (2d) 847 (Mo. Civ. App., 1936);
Mitnick v. Whalen Bros., Inc., 115 Conn. 650, 163 Atl. 414 (1932); (1937) 2 Mo. L.
REV. 251.
25. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928) ; RS9TATr-
MENT, ToRTs (1934) §§ 281, 431.
26. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935).
27. Green, supra note 21, at 775. It has been suggested that under the first
negligence formula liability could be more easily expanded. Goodhart, The Unforeseeable
Consequences of a Negligent Act (1930) 39 YALx L. J. 449; (1935) 35 COL. L. Rvv. 463.
.But under either formula the same result is possible and in most cases probable. Green,
The Palsgraf Case (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 789; Green, The Duty Problem in Ne ligqcnce
Cases (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014, (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 255.
*Adams v. Walla Walla, (1938) 2 L. R. R. 161 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Walla Walla Co.,
No. 27472, March 15, 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 82 P. (2d) 584 (Wash. 1938).
1. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1938). Fourteen states now
have legislation patterned on the federal statute; several have other restrictions on the
use of injunctions. See Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation (1935) 14 Oiru.
L. REv. 501; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1064 (complete compilation of statutes).
2. Cf. (1936) 36 CoL L. REv. 153; WiTE, THE GOVERNME NT IN LABOR Disrt'qs
(1932) 152; N. Y. Times, July 19, 1934, p. 4, col. 6.
3. Cf. Ex Parte Harder, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 153, 49 P. (2d) 304 (1935); Local Union
No. 26, National Brothers of Operative Potters v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E,
(2d) 624 (1937). It has been suggested that the enactments are indicative of public dis-
approval of recent picketing abuses. See N. Y. Times, September 19, 1938, p. 18, col. 2,
4. Comprehensive statutes to regulate strikes, boycotts and picketing, introduced by
public initiative, were defeated in California and Washington in recent elections, but were
successful in Oregon. See (1938) 3 L. R. R. 35; id. at 331. For former state statutes
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ing of the anti-injunction statutes by the courts,5 points to the complete
nullification 6 of the victories thought to have been gained by organized labor
in securing the protection of peaceful picketing.
7
Not uncommon in labor's stepchild past were ordinances which imposed
sweeping prohibitions on all forms of picketing and provided for criminal
penalties regardless of the nature, purpose, or number of the participants 8
Some courts had imposed similar restrictions even in the absence of any
legislative declaration,9 so that it is not surprising that, with few exceptions,
the ordinances were sustained as valid exercises of the police power to main-
tain public peace and regulate the use of the public streets.1" The more recent
ordinances are not quite as inclusive in their prohibitions as their forerunners,
but they still impose severe limitations on the various types of picketing
activity, going far beyond their ostensible purpose-the preservation of pub-
lic peace and order. Thus, the city council of Walla Walla, Washington,
declaring certain types of picketing activity illegal, see AL--,. Coon A:.:. (Michie, 1928)
§3448; COLO. A-NN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §464; KAN.. Rv. ST.,T. An,;. (1923) c. 44,
art. 6, § 617; NE. Comp. STAT. (1929) c. 28, art. 8, §§ 812-814; Ur.A Rs . STr. ANN.
(1933) tit. 49, c. 2, § 5.
5. Cf. Monkemeyer, Five Years of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1937) 2 Mo. L.
REv. 1; (1937) 46 Y .ss L. J. 1064; (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 116.
6. Although the injunctions were effective in throttling labor activity, the applica-
tion or misapplication of criminal statutes can constitute fully as great a threat to effec-
tive union enterprise. Though convictions may not later be secured, mass arrests are
especially effective in the early stages of a dispute. See (1937) 47 YMAL L. J. 136;
(1936) 36 Coi- L. R:v. 153; (1935) 23 CAL. L. REv. 506; N. Y. Times, September 20,
1934, p. 3, col. 3.
7. See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 .Mien. L. REw. 73.
The Supreme Court recently dispelled all doubts on the constitutionality of state anti-
injunction legislation, at the same time intimating that peaceful picketing may be a form
of persuasion entitled to protection under the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), (1937) 37 CoL. L RmE.
1227, (1937) 6 I. J. A. Burr. 1. For the status of peaceful picketing prior to the Senn
case, see CommONS AND ANDREWs, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1936) 397 cf seq.;
FRANiaFuRTER A,,D GREEN-E, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 30 et seq.
8. See Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 X. C. L. RE%.
158, 168; 3 McQuILLIN, MutmcmA CoPonAio.s (2d ed. 1923) § 999.
A typical ordinance provided, "(1) Whosoever shall watch, beset, or picket the prem-
ises of another . . . for the purpose of inducing any employee . . . by any act of vio-
lence . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (2) Whosoever shall watch . . . to induce
others to refrain from entering . . . shall utter derogatory . . . epithets or gestures . . .
guilty of a misdemeanor. . ." Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924)
(ordinance constitutional). But cf. Local Union No. 26, National Brothers of Operative
Potters v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (1937) (same ordinance un-
constitutional).
9. "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can
be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." McPherson, J., in Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582, 584 (S. D. Iova, 1905). This %%,as decidedly
the minority view. See OAKES, ORGAIZZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL COFLIcTS (1927)
§ 329.
10. Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Crim. 183, 198 S. W. 967 (1917); cf. Hardie-Tynes v.
Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914). But ef. In re Sweitzer, 13 Okla. Crim. 154, 162
Pac. 1134 (1917); Hall v. Johnson, 87 Ore. 21, 169 Pac. 515 (1917).
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adopted an ordinance declaring that "it shall be unlawful for any person to
walk back and forth, loiter, or remain on the public streets in front of any
business house in the city . . .for the purpose of persuading11 or intimidat-
ing any person to refrain from entering said place of business." Employees
were excluded from the prohibition. 2 In a declaratory judgment brought
to contest the constitutionality of the enactment it was sustained as valid
under the police power.13 The exception of employees was justified as a
means of preventing the use of "hirelings and agitators . . .who cause trou-
ble for a fixed stipend," and of limiting the right to picket to those who had
a "direct interest." The question, according to the court, was "not the right
to picket, but who shall use the streets for that purpose."
While fairly typical,'14 this ordinance by no means represents the extreme
reached in other cities. Perhaps most startling was the adoption by popular
initiative in Los Angeles'- of an ordinance prohibiting all picketing except
by a "bona fide employee" in case of a "bona fide strike."' 6 The picket must
carry a certificate of identification signed by a -designated representative of
the striking union fully stating his qualifications; he may carry a banner or
sign not to exceed twenty by thirty inches, expressing only the existence of
a strike and the name of the striking organization participating. The number
of pickets is limited to one per entrance to remain in any case at least twenty-
five feet apart. 17 The city of Cumberland, Maryland, attempted to prohibit
picketing without a permit and to require the application to be in the hand-
writing of the applicant and accompanied by a photograph of the prospective
picket.' s In Ridgewood, New Jersey, a provision for a weekly fee of $50 for
11. "'Persuasion' may be an insult and menace; it may also be an appeal to free
judgment. A vocabulary so freighted with ambiguity easily lends itself to a fictitious
issue, by confounding assumed conduct with the real conduct whose justifiability is in
question." FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 35. Thus perfectly peace-
able practices are included within the prohibition. See note 22, infra.
12. Also within the exception were those "who have been employees of said busi-
ness house within 90 days prior to engaging in the prohibited acts."
13. Adams v. Walla Walla, (1938) 2 L. R. R. 161 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Walla Walla
Co., No. 27472, March 15, 1938).
14. For other ordinances limiting the privilege to employees only, see (1937) 1-A
L. R. R. MANUAL 682, 684.
15. Proposition No. 1 of the Mayoralty election, September 17, 1938. See N. Y.
Times, September 18, 1938, Section I, p. 1, col. 3-4. This ordinance has not as yet reached
the courts. An ordinance proposed by the A. F. of L. and C. 1. 0. defining and per-
mitting peaceful picketing was defeated. See N. Y. Times, September 19, 1938, p. 18,
col. 3.
16. The term "bona fide employee" is defined as, ".....any real person who is
employed . . . and has been continuously employed . . . for a period of not less than
30 days . . . but shall not include any employee . . . if [he] shall have entered such
employment for the purpose of picketing or of creating any industrial dispute or strike."
17. It is further provided: "In the event a bona fide strike exists at some but
not all of the places of business of an employer, those places of business . . . at which
no bona fide strike exists may not be picketed."
18. The attempt was declared unconstitutional in State cx rel. Nield v. Kimble, 1-A
L. R. R. MANUAL 682 (Md. Cir. Ct., Alleghany Co., August 12, 1937). Other provi-
sions also condemned included requirements that the applicant (1) must have been a
resident for one year; (2) must furnish evidence that he is a bona fide member of a
NOTES
the privilege of carrying a sign on the streets narrowly failed to pass the city
council.-9 From a study of these and other ordinances, it seems almost in-
controvertible that the municipalities, while professing merely to curtail
abuses on the picket lines, have in effect been seeking to render useless one
of labor's most effective weapons in industrial disputes. That the weapon is
a legitimate one can no longer be questioned,2 0 yet by and large the courts
have failed to free it from municipal restraint.
Among those few cases in which anti-picketing ordinances have been
declared unconstitutional, one successful argument was that the ordinance
was too vague and comprehensive, and failed adequately to define the forbid-
den activities.2 ' These holdings manifest a recognition of the ambiguities
inherent in the word "picketing" which many have failed to consider. The
term covers a wide yariety of activities and connotes equally diverse pur-
poses.2 2 Mass picket lines as well as individual sign bearers are included
within the general classification. The difference, for example, between picket-
ing primarily concerned with preventing strike breakers from entering a plant
and picketing as an appeal to the consumer is readily apparent. While in
cases of the former type tension is apt to run high, in the latter the element
of danger is scarcely to be considered; yet both are sought to be regulated
under sweeping ordinances for the "preservation of public peace." However,
the argument that an ordinance is too vague is obviously limited in scope,2
and its effect may be easily avoided by an enterprising municipality. Thus,
although the Los Angeles ordinance applies to all situations alike, its pro-
visions are so specific that an attack along this line would probably be fruit-
less. At any rate, the argument of vagueness has generally been a make-
weight-and unsatisfactory basis for decision in constitutional cases. While
it has the merit of convenience as a simple method of overturning legisla-
tion disliked for unstated reasons, anti-picketing ordinances may successfully
be upset on more fundamental grounds.
2 4
labor union; (3) and must provide the chief of police with a copy of the banner or sign
to be carried. However, the court approved clauses limiting the right to picket to em-
ployees only; providing that the permits should be valid only for designated areas, during
designated hours and not be transferable; limiting the number to one per entrance for
retail houses and six per gate for factories; and forbidding the use of cameras.
19. See (1938) 3 L. R. R. 6; (1938) 3 L. R. R. SI
20. See note 7, supra.
21. Ex parte Harder, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 153, 49 P. (2d) 304 (1935); see Er parie
Williams, 158 Cal. 550, 111 Pac. 1035 (1910). But cf. People v. Armentrout, 118 Cal.
App. 761, 1 P. (2d) 556 (1931).
22. Attempted definitions seldom indicate the specific practice under consideration
and are therefore in hopeless confusion. Cf. Commois AND Ar MREws, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 400. For an analysis of various types of conduct in which a picketer engages,
see Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts (1932) 10 N. C. L RE.z 158,
186, n. 135.
23. Cf. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921); Connally v. Gen-
eral Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1936) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
24. Cf. the invalidation of a Fair Trade Act partly on grounds of indefiniteness in
Balzer v. Caler, 74 P. (2d) 839 (Cal. App. 1937), criticized in (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1201. It is to be noted this decision was rendered by the same California Court which
upset the anti-picketing statute as too vague. See note 21, mspra.
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Another argument, put forward chiefly by labor organizations and their
sympathizers, is based on a claimed "constitutional right to picket." Although
perhaps effective publicity material, the contention cannot be supported in
the authorities, and has met with no success in the courts.25 Picketing can-
not be regarded as other than a permissible activity which can be regulated or
curtailed so long as no existing constitutional rights are thereby infringed.
But freedom of speech is, of course, such an existing right, and its impor-
tance in attacking anti-picketing ordinances should not be underestimated.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of members of a labor union
"to make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guar-
anteed by the Constitution. '2 6 Of course, free speech may be curtailed when
its exercise invokes activities harmful in themselves and so subject to pro-
hibitions under the police power.2 7 Thus, there can be no dispute as to the
authority of municipalities to declare picketing illegal when accompanied by
intimidation, coercion, physical assault, or opprobrious or indecent language,
and when actually tending to create violence.28 On the other hand, ordinances
prohibiting picketing carried on in the absence of violence, intimidation, or
undue hindrance to pedestrians, and primarily for the purpose of publicity
and appeal, seem clearly to be such unreasonable deprivations of personal
liberty as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 It is true that where spe-
cific prohibitions are reasonably related to the end of preventing violence
or intimidation the courts cannot be asked to question the wisdom of the
legislative body.30 Thus even such severe provisions as that allowing but one
picket per entrance can perhaps not be attacked on this ground. Where, how-
ever, there is no reasonable relation between the restriction and the avowed
purpose of the ordinances-protection of the public peace-the courts should
not refuse to exercise their independent judgment. For example, the rigorous
limitations on the message to be conveyed on banners and signs imposed in
the Los Angeles ordinance seem questionable, especially in the light of the
25. Cf. Hardie-Tynes v. Cruise, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 657 (1914). But cf. St. Louis
v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908) (prohibition of picketing violates constitu-
tional right to personal liberty); see BRooKs, WHEN LABOR ORGANIZES (1937) 107.
26. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 (1937); see note 7,
supra.
27. Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249
U. S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919); Comment (1938)
48 YALE L. J. 72, 77; see 2 COOLEY, CONSTTUxONAL LimiTATioxs (8th ed. 1927) 876
et seq.
28. Cf. Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts. (1932) 10 N. C. L. Rnv.
158. But the use of such ambiguous terms has of course led to confusion and incon-
sistency. See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 34, 35.
29. St. Louis v. Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908); see (1938) 2 L. R, R.
590; cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press) ; Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (freedom of speech and assembly) ; (1936) 36 COL.
L. REv. 153, 155.
Arguments that anti-picketing ordinances were class legislation, discriminatory and
therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment have consistently failed. Thomas v.
Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924).
30. Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1924) ; Legis. (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 917.
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recent Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance
requiring licenses for the distribution of circulars and literature as a viola-
tion of freedom of the press.31 Further, the exclusion of all but employees
from the privilege of peaceful picketing in the Walla Walla ordinance, sus-
tained in the principal case, seems even more obviously to lack any reasonable
relation to the preservation of the public peace, since there is no ground for
supposing that such a limitation lessens the likelihood of disturbance.-
Hitherto, however, these contentions have generally been summarily disposed
of in the cases.33 In dealing with similar state anti-picketing statutes, it seems
even more unlikely that courts would look behind the stated purposes of the
legislation, which will be, of course, in themselves legitimate. The lack of
precedent, however, should be no deterrent to the continued use of the argu-
ment, at least until it has been passed on by the United States Supreme Court.
Nor is the contention weakened by the mass of cases sustaining against
attacks of unreasonableness statutes and ordinances interfering with rights
of property, for the Supreme Court has consistently imposed stricter standards
when considering legislative invasion of civil liberties.3 '
Perhaps the broadest avenue of attack on picketing ordinances was sug-
gested by the Supreme Court of Indiana" when it declared invalid an In-
dianapolis ordinance prohibiting all picketing, on the ground that the meas-
ure was in direct conflict with the averred public policy of the state as ex-
pressed in the anti-injunction act.a3 The argument has often been urged
elsewhere with notable lack of success,37 although in the fourteen statesas
having such enactments it is difficult to perceive how the courts could fail
31. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), (1938) 5 U. oF CUL L. Rv. 675,
(1938) 25 VA. L. REv. 96; see also People v. Banks, 6 N.Y. S. (2d) 41 (N.Y. City
Magis. Ct. 1938) ; C.I.O. et al. v. Hague, Dist. Ct. N. J., Oct. 27, 1938, (1938) 48 Y.M
L. J. 257. But cf. (1938) 7 I. J. A. BuL. 3 (listing cases disregarding Lo'dl case).
At least one judge has been reluctant to enforce the Los Angeles ordinance. See (1938)
3 L. R. R. 388.
32. Likewise, forbidding picketing unless concomitant with a "bona fide strike" can
scarcely be justified on grounds of preserving the public peace. Cf. Exchange Bakery
and Restaurant v. Rifldn, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927), (1927) 27 CoL L. Rv.
190.
33. Cf. Watters v. Indianapolis, 191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482 (1922).
34. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) ; Shul-
man, The Supreme Court's Attitudc Toward Liberly of Contract and Freedom of Speech
(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 262.
35. Local Union No. 26, National Brothers of Operative Potters v. City of Kokomo,
211 Ind. 72, 5 N. E. (2d) 624 (1937).
36. IND. STAT. AxN. (Burns, 1933) § 40-50 ct seq. Section 40-504 deprives Indiana
courts of jurisdiction to issue restraining orders or injunctions in any labor dispute to
prohibit participants from . . . (e) "Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any
other method not involving fraud or violence."
37. In the principal case the contention failed largely because the Washington In-
junction Act had been declared partially unconstitutional. Blanchard v. Golden Age
Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397 (1936). Cf. International L. G. AN. U. v.
Westminster, 1-A L. R. R. MANUAL 684 (Md. Cir. Ct., Carroll Co., November 22, 1937).
38. See note 1, supra.
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to look upon them as declaratory of state policy.39 Apparently these tribunals
would give effect to nothing short of a specific legislative declaration defining
and approving peaceful picketing. Drastic enactments by municipal councils
would then be in derogation of a right recognized by the state and could not
conceivably be upheld.40 Such explicit declarations by the state legislature
would be further advisable since on principle it seems undesirable for the
status of organized labor within a state to be determined by local option,
whether by city legislative bodies or public initiative. 41 Too well known is
the pressure that can be brought to bear upon the city fathers by a single
large manufacturer and the satellite local merchants dependent for their
market upon his payrolls.
42
The present ordinances may indicate a revival of the "judicial aphorism"
that peaceful picketing is a contradiction in terms.4 3 The wisdom of thus
embodying detailed regulations in a rigid law instead of leaving a certain
range of discretion to local police officials, enabling them to deal more flexibly
with a particular situation, is highly questionable. In practice, dangers to the
public peace arising from picketing activities can be adequately controlled
by an effective police administration. In the absence of specific ordinances
on picketing, municipal authorities can always apply the general ordinances
dealing with violations of the public peace when violence has occurred. Enact-
ments forbidding unlawful assemblies,4 4 loitering,4 5 unlicensed street adver-
tising,46 and disorderly conduct 47 have variously been so employed. Of course
the application of these ordinances can and has led to many abuses,48 but the
abuses are traceable to the government personnel involved and not to the
existence of the ordinances. Where picketing is expressly prohibited, the
paralysis of organized labor's right arm is inevitable regardless of the calibre
39. This attack is predicated, of course, on the assumption that there is no existing
state statute directed against picketing. See note 4, supra.
A similar argument has often been made, based on alleged conflict with statutes
exempting labor unions from the charge of criminal conspiracy. Ex parle Stout, 82 Tel..
Crim. 183, 198 S. NV. 967 (1917). But cf. In re Sweitzer, 13 Okla. Crim. 154, 162 Pac.
1134 (1917) (where the case was stipulated within the purview of the act).
40. See ELLIOTT, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1925) §§ 37-48.
41. By an indiscriminate use of anti-labor legislation municipalities might con-
ceivably vie with one another to attract industrial capital. Cf. (1938) 47 YALE L. 5.
1412.
42. Cf. In the Matter of Remington Rand, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 626 (1937) ; Hearbins
before Subcommittee of Committee on Education and Labor, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938)
parts 17 and 18 (National Ass'n of Manufacturers).
43. See note 9, supra.
44. City of Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 Atl. 130' (1920). But cf. State v.
Butterworth, 104 N. J. L. 579, 142 Atl. 57, (1928).
45. See 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COaPORATIONS (1928) § 999. But cf. St. Louis V.
Gloner, 210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908).
46. Commonwealth v. Haffer, 279 Mass. 73, 180 N. E. 615 (1932); Watters v.
Indianapolis, 191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482 (1922). But cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S.
444 (1938).
47. People v. Hipple, 263 N. Y. 242, 188 N. E. 725 (1934); People v. Kopezak, 153
Misc. 187, 274 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Spec. Sess., 1st Dep't 1934).
48. See (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 153, 154.
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of the public officials. If this result is to be avoided, picketing ordinances can
be justified only as endeavoring to codify existing law covering illegal activi-
ties which actually do tend to result in violence. As such, they are super-
fluous. When municipalities go further and prohibit or regulate to the point
where the legislation seems to those affected to be aimed to protect the em-
ployer rather than the public, they are probably defeating their expressed
ends by provoking greater defiance 49 of governmental authority.
POWER OF PLEDGEE OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICY TO EXERCISE
SURRENDER OPTIONS*
LIFE insurance was long considered undesirable collateral for bank loans.'
But since the 1929 panic in the securities markets, it has come into increasing
favor with bankers because of its unfluctuating and readily liquid value.2 Yet
unless the cash surrender or loan privileges, provided for in practically all
modern life policies, are accessible to the bank, it may find itself with nothing
better than a long-term investment or wager on its hands.3 The problem
of whether the pledgee 4 of life insurance has power to exercise these and
49. Cf. Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Ycllow Dog Con-
tracts (1936) 30 ILL. L. REv. 854.
*Brown v. New York Life Insurance Company, 22 F. Supp. 82 (NV. D. S. C. 1938).
1. See Excerpts from Bankers' Correspondence-Life Instirance as Collateral (1929)
21 Asima BAN'TK=R Ass'x J. 862, 1040.
2. See Stanley, Life hItsrance as Collateral (1933) 127 BAmmsEs' MAG. 237; Smith,
Assets Revealed it Insurance Cash Values (1934) 129 BAm;KES' MAG. 471.
3. It is well established that, in any event, a pledgee has a first lien on the proceeds
of the policy when it matures on the death of the insured. Taylor v. Southern Bank:
& Trust Co., 227 Ala. 565, 151 So. 357 (1933). Nor are statutes which exempt the
proceeds of life insurance from the claims of creditors applicable where the policy has
been assigned as security. Bancroft v. West, 128 Fla. 193, 174 So. 327 (1937) ; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Twyman, 122 Ky. 513, 92 S. NV. 335 (1905) ; Ferris v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 241 App. Div. 570, 272 N. Y. Supp. 781 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 265 N.Y.
527, 195 N. E. 184 (1935). The assignability of policies with vested beneficiaries is
considered in Holland, Life Insurance as Collateral (1937) (pamphlet published by
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Hartford).
The pledgee has the right to pay premiums to keep the policy alive and add such
sums to the indebtedness of the insured. Central State Bank v. Edwards, Ill S.V.
(2d) 873 (Tenn. App. 1937). But if the pledgee is required to pay premiums until
the death of the insured before it can realize any cash, it may have to advance a sum,
which, with the amount of the original debt, will exceed the proceeds of the policy.
4. Since cases involving borrowing from the insurance company, with the policy
pledged as security, represent a different institutional situation, they will not be con-
sidered in this note. Although the legal questions involved are nominally the same as
in a case in which a bank is the pledgee, they are complicated by e.-traneous considera-
tions. Failure to repay a policy loan is almost always associated with failure to pay
premiums, and courts frequently confuse the issue of the powers of a pledgee to sur-
render the policy with the issue of the powers of the company to cancel the policy for
nonpayment of premiums.
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other options 5 contained in the policy after the insured-pledgor has defaulted
on his obligation thus assumes critical importance. The uncertainty prevalent
in banking and insurance circles is discernible from frequent articles in bank-
ing magazines 6 as well as from constant legal controversy. Litigation follows
three principal patterns. The bank's demand on an insurance company for
the cash value of a policy held as security is frequently carried to the courts.3
Or an insured or beneficiary, alleging wrongful surrender of the policy, may
sue a pledgee for conversion or for breach of the pledge contract.8 And,
thirdly, an insurance company, after the death of the insured, may be sub-
jected to a suit by a beneficiary for the face amount of a policy after the cash
value had already been paid out to the pledgee.9
The last situation is illustrated by a recent federal district court decision.
The insured, holder of three policies on his life payable to his estate, trans-
ferred these contracts to his bank by executing assignments absolute in form.
The only consideration for the transfer was a preexisting debt of the insured
to the bank which apparently exceeded the aggregate face value of the docu-
ments. The bank, after paying premiums for several years, applied to the
insurer for loans on the policies. The company, uncertain about the right
of a collateral assignee to exercise the loan value provisions, finally assented
on the basis of the bank's repeated assertions that the assignments had in
fact been absolute. The advances were made to the bank without the knowledge
or consent of the insured, but the amounts received were credited to his
account. Upon the insured's death three years later, the insurance company
denied all liability to the insured's administratrix, maintaining that the ex-
tended insurance which automatically came into effect upon default in pay-
ment of premiums had expired before death occurred. But for the fact that
the loans had been made, extended insurance for the full face value of the
policies would have continued far beyond the date of the insured's death.
The administratrix brought suit against the insurer, alleging that the com-
pany had breached the contracts of insurance by making loans to the bank
and reducing the term of extended insurance. The court sustained plaintiff's
claim.' 0 It ruled that the original transfer of the policies to the bank was
5. In addition to the loan provision, policies usually include options for con-
version into insurance for the full face amount of the policy for a limited term, or into
paid-up insurance for a reduced amount. For brevity, the term "surrender option" will
be used to include all such options, since courts have considered the same rules to be
applicable regardless of which option has been sought to be exercised.
6. See Heyer, Life Insurance as Collateral (Nov. 1933) 26 AmrR. BANKrRS Ass'n
J. 32; (Dec. 1934) 27 AmEn. BANIERS Ass'N J. 55; (Jan. 1933) 25 AMEm. BANXRMS
ASS'N J. 47; (March 1933) 25 AMxER. BANKERS Ass'N J. 59.
7. Emery v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 179 Ky. 76, 200 S. W. 19 (1918)
(pledgee was private individual); Central State Bank v. Edwards, Ill S.W. (2d) 873
(Tenn. App. 1937).
8. McGimpsey v. Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 10 N. J. Misc. 17, 157 Atl. 441
(Sup. Ct. 1931); Higgins v. Helmbold, 48 App. D. C. 50 (1918).
9. Coleman v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 236 Mass. 552, 129 N. E. 288
(1920); Cockrill v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 103 S. W. (2d) 399 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937).
10. Brown v. New York Life Insurance Co., 22 F. Supp. 82 (W. D. S. C. 1938).
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merely a collateral assignment, and that a pledgee, in the absence of a definite
provision in the pledge contract permitting the sale of the policy, has only
the right to collect the death benefits and no right to sell or surrender until
the pledge lien is foreclosed according to statute.
This statement of the law, while based on respectable authority, 1 has by
no means received unanimous judicial acceptance. It has been stated, on the
contrary, to be too obvious to merit discussion that the pledging of a policy
as security by itself implies sufficient authorization, or grant of power of
attorney, to the pledgee to surrender the policy or exercise its loan pro-
visions.12 A sizeable number of opinions echo this doctrine.r 3 Legal analyses
of the nature of the typical transaction of assigning a policy as security are
correspondingly diverse. An early case calls the hypothecation a species of
mortgage,'4 while a recent decision refers to the collateral assignee as the
"owner."' 5  Most courts, however, concede that the transaction is one of
pledge,'6 and that the legal title remains in the pledgor.',
Faced with this array of conflicting statements and apparently contradictory
holdings, banks have devised an exhaustively-phrased printed form in an
effort to avoid the necessity of resorting to judicial proceedings in liquidating
pledged policies. It is a growing banking practice to have the borrower
execute an absolute assignment of his policy, which first purports unreser%,edly
to transfer all right, title and interest, and which, secondly, contains special
authorization to the bank to surrender the policy without notice.18 This
procedure is deemed necessary despite the fact that the promissory note which
is usually signed as part of the same transaction itself contains sweeping
11. The court quotes verbatim from Coo.Ev, BRiEas ox I.NsURAcE: (2d ed. 1928)
6527, which cites in support of the te\-xt Grossman v. Lindeman, 67 Misc. 437, 123 N.Y.
Supp. 108 (Sup. Ct 1910). Other opinions containing similar statements include New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781, 784 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Emery v. Manhattan
Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky. 76, 80, 200 S. AV. 19, 20 (1918); Jordan v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 150 So. 419, 420 (La. App. 1933).
12. Bank of Idana v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 135 Kan. 1-9, 9 P. (2d) 629 (1932).
13. Higgins v. Helmbold, 48 App. D. C. 50 (1918) ; 1McGimpsey v. Security Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 10 N. J. lisc. 17, 157 Atl. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Wilson v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 123 Pa. Super. 364, 187 At. 251 (1936); Cockrill v. Southwestern Life Ins.
Co., 103 S. NV. (2d) 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); see General American Life Ins. Co.
v. Fraventhal & Schwarz, 193 Ark 663, 666, 101 S. MV. (2d) 953, 954 (1937). See
L. R_ A. 1918C 570 and cases cited.
14. Dungan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 46 Md. 469 (1877).
15. Snyder, to use of Cochran v. Home Life Ins. Co., 328 Pa. 424, 195 Ad. 895
(1938).
16. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Keeble
v. Jones, 187 Ala. 207, 65 So. 384 (1914). The transaction is not an "assignment" within
the meaning of a clause in a statute or in the policy prohibiting assignments. Stokes
v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 130 S. C. 521, 126 S. E. 649 (1925).
17. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937);
Katz v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531, 191 N. E. 782 (1934). Contra: Widaman
v. Hubbard, 88 Fed. 806 (C. C. S. D. Calif. 1898).
18. See Holland, Life Inmirance as Collateral (June 1934) 26 Axm BA imrs Ass.-
J. 40; Letter from a "Large New York City Bank" (larch 1933) 25 A2IE. B,,ixmps
Ass'x J. 59.
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sanctions to dispose of collateral in any manner. Many insurance companies,
on the theory that while an absolute assignee will have the right to exercise
the policy options a collateral assignee may not, refuse to risk compliance
with a bank's request for the surrender value unless these two formalities
have been completed. 19
Yet despite such precautions, it is clear that courts attach little weight to
either of these formal requirements, considering them neither indispensable
nor conclusive. As to the assignment, it is uniformly held, as in the principal
case, that an assignment absolute in form may be shown by parole to have
been given only as security.20 Yet the absolute form is not essential, for even
an oral assignment or mere physical deposit with the bank has been held
to be, in the absence of statute, a valid pledge.2 1 And in the great majority
of reported cases in which the bank has been held empowered to exercise
the surrender options without preliminary formal foreclosure of the pledge,
the assignment was on its face merely an assignment as security.22 As to
the provision for surrender, in most of the cases permitting the exercise of
the options, there does not appear to have been any further authorization than
that which ordinarily appears on a promissory note form.23 Moreover, even
19. See Heyer, Life Insurance as Collateral (Nov. 1933) 26 AMER. BANIKzRS Ass'xl
J. 32; (Jan. 1933) 25 AmER. BAxicmEs Ass'x J. 47.
20. Garner v. Townes, 134 Miss. 791, 100 So. 20 (1924). See cases cited in the
principal case, Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 F, Supp. 82, 86 (W. D. S. C. 1938).
If the insurance company had no reason to know the transaction was not, in fact, an
absolute assignment, the insured and those claiming under him may be estopped, in a
suit against the company, from showing the assignment to have been merely a pledge.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). But an insurance
company, regardless of the form of assignment, would have good clause to suspect that
the bank was only a pledgee. Compare the letter sent by the insurance company to the
bank in the principal case. Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra, at 87.
21. Allan v. Gaar, 160 So. 156 (La. App. 1935); Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v.
Bank of California, 177 Wash. 130, 30 P. (2d) 972 (1934).
22. Conlew, Inc. v. Kaufman, 269 N. Y. 481, 199 N. E. 767 (1936) ; see cases cited
supra notes 12 and 13.
Cases in which the assignment was absolute in form and surrender permitted include
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Healey, 25 App. Div. 53, 49 N. Y. Supp. 29 (3d Dep't 1898),
aff'd, 164 N. Y. 607, 58 N. E. 1093 (1900) ; Snyder, to use of Cochran v. Home Life
Ins. Co., 328 Pa. 424, 195 At. 895 (1938).
Cases in which the assignment was absolute in form and surrender held unwarranted
include New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Missouri
State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Emery v. Man-
hattan Life Insurance Co., 179 Ky. 76, 200 S. W. 19 (1918) ; Dungan v. Mutual Benefit
Life Insurance Co., 46 Md. 469 (1877) ; see also cases cited infra note 24.
23. See cases cited supra notes 12 and 13. Cases in which there was explicit author-
ization to surrender upon default and in which surrender was held legal include Planters
State Bank v. Willingham's Assignee, 111 Ky. 64, 63 S. W. 12 (1901); Coleman v.
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 236 Mass. 552, 129 N. E. 288 (1920) ; Cornell
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 179 Mo. App. 420, 165 S.W. 858 (1914) (insured gave hit
assent to surrender when note fell due); see Bailey v. American Deposit Co., 52 App.
Div. 402, 404, 65 N. Y. Supp. 330, 331 (1st Dep't 1900), aft'd, 165 N. Y. 672, 59 N. E.
1118 (1901). In Conlew, Inc. v. Kaufman, 269 N. Y. 481, 199 N. E. 767 (1936), the
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where surrender upon default has been explicitly sanctioned, the pledgees
right may be denied on the ground that such authorization was waived by
granting an indefinite extension of time to the borrower.-4 The use of the
latter stipulation, however, is undoubtedly justifiable, if for no other than
evidentiary reasons.
Despite the disharmony in the opinions it is possible to abstract a uniform
rule from the cases. The collateral assignee may probably exercise the sur-
render options, but only if he has given the insured due notice of tie intended
surrender, i.e., notice which affords a reasonable opportunity to redeem the
pledge.A In every instance in which such notice was given, the surrender
was held legitimate.2 In every case, on the other hand, in which it definitely
appears that the pledgee neglected to inform the insured of the attempted
action, the surrender was held wrongful or inoperative. - All the cases referred
to by writers on the subject in which a pledgee is held to have no power to
exercise the surrender options-including four of the five cases cited by the
court seems to regard the usual collateral agreement provision, that the bank "may at
its option sell the .. . property at public or private sale without notice" a sufficient
express authorization to exercise the surrender option. No notice had been given the
insured or his sureties. Brief for Respondent, Page 4, Conlew, Inc. v. Kaufman, spra.
In pledge transactions in general, the pledgor may waive the right to have notice
of the sale. Whitman v. Boston Terminal Refrigerating Co., 233 Mass. 386, 124 N. E.
43 (1919); Wilkes v. Allegan Fruit and Produce Co., 233 Mich. 215, 206 N. NV. 483
(1925).
24. Toplitz v. Bauer, 161 N. Y. 325, 55 N. E. 1059 (1900); Bailey v. American
Deposit Co., 52 App. Div. 402, 65 N. Y. Supp. 330 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 165 N. Y.
672, 59 N. E. 1118 (1901). Cf. Missouri Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 586
(C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
25. A functional approach would indicate the decisive nature of notice. Investigation
has confirmed the belief that banks ordinarily do not undertake to liquidate life insurance
policies held as collateral without contacting the insured and giving him a reasonable
opportunity to recover his policy by settling his account.
26. Exceptions to this rule are cases where a beneficiary's vested interest intervened
(see cases cited infra note 37) and a case where there was apparently no consideration
for the assignment. Moser v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 134 Ky. 215, 119 S. NV.
792 (1909) (cited infra note 37).
27. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937);
Dungan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 46 Md. 469 (1877) ; Toplitz v. Bauer, 161 N.Y.
325, 55 N.E. 1059 (1900) ; Bailey v. American Deposit Co., 52 App. Div. 402, 65 N.Y.
Supp. 330 (1st Dep't 1900), aff'd, 165 N.Y. 672, 59 N. E. 1118 (1901); Manton v.
Robinson, 37 AtI. 8 (R. 1. 1896). The principal case also falls into this category. In
the following cases, in which the pledgee's surrender power was denied, it is impossible
to ascertain definitely from the facts reported whether notice had been given, but it is
a fair inference from statements in the opinions that, in each case, there was a failure
to notify the insured. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. Sth,
1927) ; Emery v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky. 76, 200 S. V. 19 (1918) ; Grossman
v. Lindeman, 67 Misc. 437, 123 N. Y. Supp. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1910). An exception to this
rule is Conlew, Inc. v. Kaufman, 269 N. Y. 481, 199 N. E. 767 (1936), cited supre
note 23, but in that case there was express authorization to the pledgee to surrender.
In Higgins v. Helmbold, 48 App. D. C. 50 (1918), holding a surrender valid, there is
no certain indication as to whether notice was given.
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court in the principal case 28-may be explained on this basis. 20 The requisite
notice may take a wide variety of forms. Apparently the significant require-
ment is that it let the insured know what is contemplated and give him a
last chance to redeem his policy before the irrevocable act of surrender is
consummated. Notice may consist in a direct communication to the insured,3 0
or it may take the form of service of process on him in a suit on his note
or other obligation,31 in a suit to foreclose on the policy,32 or in a suit in
which the insured and insurer are joined as defendants.33 Advertisement and
public sale 34 or a levy on the policy 35 may likewise serve as sufficient notifi-
cation. Actual consent of the insured, despite statements to the contrary,
is probably immaterial even in the absence of an express authorization to
surrender.36 There is apparently no case holding consent necessary where
the insured had been given notice. In any event, consent can always be inferred
from the pledgor's failure to redeem after notice has been received.
There are other factors which may have significance in determining a
pledgee's powers,37 but the question which has caused the greatest difficulty is
28. fissouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F. (2d) 586 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ;
Emery v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky. 76, 200 S. W. 19 (1918); Toplitz v. Bauer,
161 N. Y. 325, 55 N. E. 1059 (1900) ; Grossman v. Lindeman, 67 Misc. 437, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ; all cited supra note 27. In the fifth case cited, the transac-
tion was held not to have been a pledge at all, but an absolute assignment, and the
assignee was permitted to recover the surrender value from the insurance company.
Jordan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 150 So. 419, 152 So. 778 (La. App. 1934).
29. Cf. the statement to this effect in Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 123 Pa. Super.
364, 368, 187 Atl. 251, 253 (1936). These holdings are thus in substantial accord with
the rules governing the liquidation of pledged property in general, including corporation
securities. A pledgee has, as a normal incident of the pledge transaction, the power
to sell after default. In re Peacock, 178 Fed. 851 (E. D. N. C. 1910) ; Haynes v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 231 S. W. 361 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921). But reasonable notice
must first be given the pledgor. In re Berberich's Estate, 257 Pa. 181, 101 Atl. 461
(1917).
30. Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 123 Pa. Super. 364, 187 Atl. 251 (1936).
31. McGimpsey v. Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 10 N. J. Misc. 17, 157 Atl. 441
(Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Cockrill v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 103 S. W. (2d) 399 (Tex, Civ.
App. 1937).
32. Ferris v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 241 App. Div. 570, 272 N. Y. Supp. 781
(4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N. Y. 527, 195 N. E. 184 (1935).
33. Bank of Idana v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 135 Kan. 129, 9 P. (2d) 629 (1932);
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 160 Ky. 538, 169 S. W. 1028 (1914)
cf. Snyder, to use of Cochran v. Home Life Ins. Co., 328 Pa. 424, 195 Atl. 895 (1938).
These cases can hardly be considered instances of judicial foreclosure of the policy.
According to well established rules, a cause of action must exist at the time suit is
instituted regardless of whether one does at the time judgment is rendered. Since the
pledgee was awarded judgment and costs against the insurance company in these cases,
it follows that the company must have breached its contract duty to pay the surrender
value before any judicial action was taken against the insured.
34. Central State Bank v. Edwards, 111 S. W. (2d) 873 (Tenn. App. 1937).
35. Cf. Citizens' Bank v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 141 So. 481 (La. App, 1932).
36. Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 123 Pa. Super. 364, 187 Atl. 251 (1936) ; Bank of
Idana v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 135 Kan. 129, 9 P. (2d) 629 (1932).
37. Where the assignment is considered insufficient to defeat or convey a "vested"
interest of a beneficiary, or where the interests in the policy are so distributed that the
whether it is necessary to complete formal forclosure of the collateral to make
the surrender options available.38 The argument is made that if surrender of a
policy is a sale to the insurance company, such proceedings are essential, but if,
on the contrary, surrender is merely the exercise of a contractual right given
by the insurance agreement, the securing of the cash value by the pledgee is not
a foreclosure of the pledge, and no special procedure is required. Regardless
of the legal nature of the transaction, it seems clear that the surrender of
an insurance policy, extinguishing all of the insured's interest, necessarily
involves a cutting off, or "foreclosure" of his "equity of redemption." The
sole question, then, appears to be what steps, designed to protect the insured,
must be taken in order to validate such action. Many of the methods of
notification mentioned above as constituting a sufficient preliminary to the
exercise of the policy options by the pledgee scarcely amount to formal fore-
closure. And nearly all the cases in which actual notice alone has been held
adequate have occurred in jurisdictions in which the common law with respect
to foreclosure of pledges by public sale has not been modified by statute. It is
not clear, therefore, in states where a statutory procedure is stipulated for
the foreclosure of pledges by sale (and surrender has not been expressly
authorized by the pledgor), whether such formal public sale or judicial action
must be undertaken by a pledgor who desires to cash a policy held as security.
There are several unqualified statements affirming this proposition in the
decisions, based on the view that surrender of a policy is legally a sale. 2
insured himself could not have obtained the surrender value, the pledgee of course is
under the same disability. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hagerman, 19 Colo. App. 33, 72 Pac.
889 (1903); Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 141, 51 AtI. 759 (1902); Wilde
v. Wilde, 209 Mass. 205, 95 N. E. 295 (1911). But in a situation identical with that in
Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, it was held the pledgee could reach the surrender
value. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Healey, 25 App. Div. 53, 49 N. Y. Supp. 29 (3d Dep't
1898), af'd, 164 N. Y. 607, 58 N. E. 1093 (1900). Cf. Caplin v. Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 182 App. Div. 269, 169 N. Y. Supp. 756 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 545,
129 N. E. 908 (1920). Two cases appear to have been decided on the theory that, under
the terms of the individual policy involved, the power to exercise the cash value option
may be personal to the insured and therefore unassignable. Townsend's Assignee v.
Townsend, 127 Ky. 230, 105 S. W. 937 (1907); Moser v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 134 Ky. 215, 119 S. IV. 792 (1909). The force of these decisions may be questioned.
In the first, a vested beneficiary did not consent to the assignment, and the court gave
considerable weight to an exemption statute. In the other, there appears to have been
no consideration for the assignment. Further, this theory has received currency in only
one jurisdiction, and even there no case decided within the last thirty years has denied
the assignee's surrender power on this ground.
38. Although banks are desirous of liquidating policies held as security with as little
red tape and ceremony as possible, many insurance companies, to protect themselves,
insist that every surrender be sanctioned by a court order [Cf. Feliciana Bank v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 137 La. 674, 69 So. 91 (1915)] or by written consent of the insured.
See cases cited supra note 36.
39. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rees, 19 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). It has
also been stated that foreclosure is necessary on the ground that only the unqualified
owner of an insurance policy can exercise the surrender options. Jordan v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 150 So. 419 (La. App. 1933), rev'd on rehearing, 152 So. 778 (La. App.
1934), cited snpra note 28; cf. Emery v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 179 Ky. 76, 200
S. IV. 19 (1918).
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But there appears to be no case holding that, although actual notice has been
given, formal foreclosure is still necessary.40 Such a requirement would in
fact be pointless. A judicial decree or the advertisement and public sale of
a life insurance policy-the value of which is definitely fixed by actuarial
computation-can afford no greater protection to the pledgor than is pro-
vided by the sole requirement of reasonable notice. 41 Since the cash surrender
of a life insurance policy is a transaction sui generis, not generally construed
to be a sale,42 statutory provisions might well be considered inapplicable.
While there can be little doubt that "notice" has played the dominant role
throughout, it has rarely been made an express issue or treated as the ground
of decision. Courts, consciously or not, have preferred to mould their opinions
out of formalistic arguments about the legal significance of the various elements
in the pledge agreement. This procedure can find scant justification. A frank
recognition of the true basis of decision would make for the universal adop-
tion of a definite and equitable rule of notice, which would be heartily
welcomed by banks and insurance companies as the solution to a vexing
problem that increases in significance with the growing use of insurance
policies as collateral.
SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST FEDERAL EMPLOYEES *
GARNISHMENT has been most effective in the struggle to strike the judg-
ment-proof, but even this weapon of creditors has a seriously limited range.
The usual garnishment statute reaches only debts due or about to become
due,1 and despite a generally liberal interpretation of this limitation 2 it has
40. There are numerous instances where formal foreclosure proceedings were suc-
cessfully undertaken. Gordon v. Ware Nat. Bank, 132 Fed. 444 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904);
Moon v. Williams, 102 Fla. 214, 135 So. 555 (1931); Davidson's Ex'r v. Hieatt, 113
S.W. 891 (Ky. 1908).
41. A similar opinion is expressed in Comment (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 203, 211.
42. In approving surrenders by pledgees, courts have consistently ignored the well
established rule that the sale of pledged property must be at public auction, unless a
private sale is specifically authorized by the pledge contract. See cases cited .supra
note 8.
* Crown Oil Co., Inc. v. Eitner, 199 Atd. 901 (N. J. Cir. Ct., 1938).
1. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5763; ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 62, § 5; MxciU.
Comp. LAWS (1929) § 14858; Omo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 10270. For a stricter
type of statute, see MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 246, § 24 (due "absolutely and without
any contingency"); MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9361 ("due absolutely and without
depending on any contingency").
2. Finch v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 101 Conn. 332, 125 Atl. 628, 38 A. L. R. 1068
(1924) (obligation garnishable, though "unliquidated" and subject to "condition prece-
dent"); Ottumwa Nat. Bank v. Norfolk, 185 Iowa 1334, 172 N. W. 3 (1919) (contingent
claims garnishable if subject only to "condition subsequent"); Philbrook v. Mercantile
Trust Co. of Calif., 84 Cal. App. 187, 257 Pac. 882 (1927) (debt not payable until future
time is garnishable) ; Goodman v. Meriden Britannia Co., 50 Conn. 139 (1882) (total
amount of installment payments, subject to "condition subsequent," garnishable).
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usually been construed to prevent garnishment from being a continuing levy
on the debtor's income.3 Only one installment of a periodic income such as
wages may be reached by a single writ.4 Since these installments are usually
small, the cost of successive garnishments is virtually prohibitive. Hence,
when a debtor has no available property of any value, the usual statute, in
practical effect, leaves the creditor remediless, even though the debtor could
make installment payments out of wages without undue hardslfip. In an
attempt to penetrate this insulation of the wage earner, a few jurisdictions
have enacted statutes permitting garnishment to be a continuing levy on the
income of the judgment debtor.5 Even this innovation has not proven entirely
satisfactory, for it fails to reach both the judgment debtor whose income is
derived solely from a "discretionary" or "spendthrift" trust" and the judgment
debtor whose employer cooperates in the evasion of garnishment process by
paying each installment of wages in advance, thus leaving nothing "due" at
any time.7 Several statutes have eliminated this flaw in collection proced-
ure by extending the equity concept of an in pcrsonam order so as to permit
a court to command the debtor himself to pay in installments.8
In a recent New Jersey case,9 an attempt was made to utilize this type of
statute where garnishment was unavailable because the debtor was employed
by a sovereign authority immune to the ervice of process. The plaintiff had
recovered a judgment, upon which execution was returned unsatisfied. An
order for discovery was entered, a hearing was held thereon, and the plaintiff,
acting under a New Jersey statute,10 applied for an order directing the de-
fendant himself to pay a sum certain semi-monthly out of his salary as an
employee of the Federal Treasury Department. The application was denied
on the ground that it was against public policy to grant such an order against
the salary of a public official. The court reached this result on the basis of a
curious theory embodied in the case of Schwenk v. V-ycl:off," decided in
1890. The rule was there enunciated that an assignment of unearned pay by
3. First National Bank v. Hosier, 234 Ill. App. 605 (1924) ; Malone . Moore, 204
Iowa 625, 215 N. W. 625 (1927) ; Lund v. Dole Valve Co., 135 Ill. App. 350 (1914).
4. Seymour v. Over River School-District, 53 Conn. 502, 3 At. 552 (1825)
(wages); Calechman v. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 120 Conn. 265, 190 Atl. 450
(1935) (rent); Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn. 293, 97 AtL 337 (1916) (income from trust
fund); Frieze v. Powell, 79 Wash. 433, 140 P. 690 (1914) (wages); IL. R v. STAT.
(1937) c. 62, § 14: ("No employer so served with garnishment shall in any case he
liable to answer for any amount not earned by such employee at the time of the ser-
vice of the writ of garnishment.")
5. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 634; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 26, § 183.
6. Spend-Thrift Trust: Driver v. Driver, 187 Ark. 875, 63 S. AV. (2d) 274 (1933);
San Diego Trust & Say. Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. (2d) 15S (1932).
Discretionary Trust: Meek v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 610, 54 N. IV. 456 (1893) ; Holcomb v.
Palmer, 106 Me. 17, 75 At]. 324 (1909).
7. Huntington v. Jones, 72 Conn. 45, 43 At. 564 (1899); Campagna v. Auto-
matic Elec. Co., 293 Ill. App. 437, 12 N. E. (2d) 695 (1938).
8. CoxN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846d; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit 2, C.26,
§ 181; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 793.
9. Crown Oil Co., Inc. v. Eitner, 199 At. 901 (N. J. Circ. Ct, 1933).
10. N. J. Rrv. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 26, § 181.
11. 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 20 AUt. 259 (1890).
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a public official is void, for if the officer were thus deprived of his salary
"there would arise a hazard of his being driven into an inappropriate mean-
ness of living, of his being harassed by the worry of straitened cir-
cumstances, and tempted to engage in unofficial labor, and of the likeli-
hood of his falling off in that official interest and vigilance which the expec-
tation of pay keeps alive."'12 Thus in situations where the debtor's employer
cannot be garnished because of sovereign immunity1" and the debtor himself
does not have sufficient property on which execution may be levied, the
instant decision denies the only remaining recourse for the creditor.
The odd public policy expressed in the Schwenk case seems to have been
devastated by relatively recent New Jersey statutes permitting creditors to
proceed against the state and its subdivisions by way of garnishment.14 The
legislative policy which prompted this subjection of the wages of govern-
mental employees to involuntary loss by garnishment is certainly inconsistent
with the former judicial policy which protected those wages even from loss
by voluntary assignment.15 The court in the instant decision admits this
statutory revision of the former rule of sanctity of official salaries but states
baldly that "this abrogation does not extend to the salaries of officials of
the United States Government."' 6 .From any point of view, this distinction
is highly tenuous. The New Jersey legislature made available all salaries
within its jurisdiction, and the mere fact that it had no authority to allow
garnishment of the Federal Government does not appear to be a sufficient
reason for inferring that the public policy of the state remained unchanged
in regard to in personam orders against federal employees. The theory of
Schwenk v. Wyckoff that assignment of salary would promote less efficient
service through depriving the employee of his means of support is no more
pertinent to federal employees than it is to those of state, county and munici-
12. Id. at 562, 20 AtI. at 260.
13. Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20 (U. S. 1846); Note 56 A. L. R. 602. Rea-
sons given by the courts for the exemption generally fall into two categories: (1) Ad-
ministrative difficulties entitle the state to assert its sovereign immunity from process.
This argument seems answered by the fact that many states have legislatively waived their
immunity from garnishment process [see, e.g., note 14, infra]. (2) Making salaries avail-
able in garnishment would result in inefficient service from the employee. The economic
validity of this argument is questionable, as pointed out in the text. The opposite point
of view has been ably stated in Waterbury v. Deer Lodge County, 10 Mont. 515, 26 Pac.
1002 (1891). But even though the concept of sovereign immunity from garnishment
process may be unsatisfactory on argumentative grounds, it is nevertheless the general
rule unless waived by statute. See Lichtenstein, Garnishient of Public Employees (1936)
3 U. oF Cai. L. REv. 291; (1938) 22 MiNe L. RaV. 293.
14. N. J. Ray. STAT. (1937) tit. 2, c. 26, § 182 ct seq. These provisions were first
introduced in 1915.
15. In the recent case of Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank v. Dam, 199 Atl. 418
(N. J. Dist. Ct. 1938) a lower New Jersey court reached an opposite conclusion in
holding that a retired officer of the U. S. Navy could be ordered to pay a judgment in
installments out of his pension. The court admitted that the rule of public policy for-
mulated in the Schwenk case would be controlling if still in force, but went on to say
that in view of later New Jersey legislation [see note 14, supra] "the above rule of pub-
lic policy seems to have changed."
16. Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, 199 Atl. 901, 902 (N. J. Circ. Ct., 1938).
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pality. Hence it may reasonably be inferred that in reversing its policy as
to the latter, the New Jersey legislature did not intend to leave unchanged
the judicial policy of non-availability of federal salaries. But even if the
court were correct in its belief that the policy of the Scihwenk case remains
unchanged as to federal employees, application of that policy to the instant
situation seems open to question. The rule of the cited case .as the product
of deep concern over a hard-pressed wage earner's assignment of his means
of support. The issue in the instant case involves no such deprivation of the
debtor's means of support, but only of that increment of income over and
above what is necessary for his reasonable maintenance. The statute in ques-
tion expressly provides that the terms of payment are to be at the court's
discretion. 17 This provision for protection of the debtor against overly
stringent terms of payment would seem to render irrelevant the rule of policy
which constitutes the basis of the court's decision.
18
If the court felt compelled by stare decisis to rule as it did concerning the
survival and applicability of the aged rule of policy, it still might have avoid-
ed its present decision by taking advantage of a seemingly unimportant dis-
tinction between the facts of Schwcnk v. Wyckoff and those of the instant
case. In the former, it was held that the unearned salary of a public official
could not be* assigned; that is, the salary was protected until the officer
earned it. In the instant case, on the other hand, the court order does not
apply to the salary until it comes into the debtor's possession. While this
difference may be called a purely technical one, and while it may be argued
that an order to turn over income after it is paid really amounts to an invol-
untary assignment, nevertheless the New York courts have fastened on this
distinction between earned and unearned salaries in interpreting a similar
statute.19 With the same basic policy prohibiting the assignment of unearned
compensation,2 0 recovery has been consistently allowed in New York, on the
ground that "after the money is paid by the federal government to its em-
ployee it becomes the private property of the individual, and the state has
the right to cause it to be applied to the payment of a judgment."2' A similar
approach by the New Jersey courts would be in line with legislative declara-
tions removing the prohibitions against garnishment of state, count, and
municipal salaries.
17. N. 3. Rev. STAT. (1937) it. 2, c. 26, § 181.
18. In Asbury Park and Ocean Grove Bank v. Dam, 199 Adt. 418, 419 (N. 3. Dist.
Ct, 1938) the court said "the statute in the exemption of income belo,, the prescribed
minimum and by the provision limiting the amount to be made available for creditors
affords ample protection against want."
19. N. Y. Civ. PAc. Acr § 793.
20. Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442 (1874). Accord: Diehl v. Sheehan, 233 App.
Div. 258, 251 N. Y. Supp. 254 (4th Dep't 1931) aff'd, 258 N. Y. 624, 180 N. E. 360 (1932).
21. Reeves v. Crowninshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (1937); Dibner v.
Cousminer, 157 Misc. 229, 230, 283 N. Y. Supp. 369, 370 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935) (W. P. A.
worker not subject to garnishment, but is subject to order to pay, unless salary gives only
minimum needs). Other New York cases holding federal employees subject to a court
order to pay under § 793 are: Bool Floral Co. v. Coyne, 158 Misc. 13, 284 N. Y. Supp.
960 (County Ct. 1936) (district publicity director of NV. P. A.); Cross Bay Lumber Co.
v. Samoa, 161 Misc. 458, 293 N. Y. Supp. 794, (Sup. Ct., 1936) (employee of H. 0. L. C.).
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In addition to its obvious legal shortcomings, economic considerations
appear to militate against the court's position, for discrimination against
creditors of federal employees will act indirectly as a discrimination against
the protected employees themselves. Their creditors are left virtually with-
out remedy. Garnishment is unavailable, 22 and in the small-income groups in
which the problem most often arises, 23 the debtor will generally have no
property subject to execution. From the debtor's point of view, this dis-
crimination against his creditor will probably result in a restriction of the
extension of credit to the federal employee. Though credit extension based
on easy collection methods has been the target of some criticism, 24 neverthe-
less, there are certain arguments in its favor.2 Many durable goods that
were once luxuries but have now become necessities are available to the low-
salaried man only through installment selling. Since the success of the in-
stallment plan depends on a minimum of credit risk, a judicial attitude deny-
ing recourse against the salary of a federal employee will tend to deprive
him of the benefits of this method of purchase. Once a state stands committed
by legislation to a policy of easy collection methods, it seems highly inequit-
able for a court to presume to discriminate on grounds of archaic public
policy against creditors of federal employees alone. This discrimination will
perhaps have an effect exactly opposite to that which the underlying rule of
policy was intended to achieve. Instead of insuring "decent and comfortable
support"26 to the employee, it may very well deprive him of the opportunity
of owning goods that would make his existence far easier and more enjoy-
able.
DISPOSITION BY SOLVENT BANKS OF NOTES GIVEN To GUARANTEE ASSETS *
MANY banks of unquestioned present soundness were perilously close to fail-
ure during the dark days of the early thirties. To stave off disaster, directors
and stockholders were in many instances prevailed upon to transfer personal
notes and securities to their banks in an attempt to bolster depleted assets
and relieve capital impairment. These transactions usually took place with
the concurrence, and occasionally with the encouragement, of state banking
commissioners. Often the contributions were made with the express or
tacit understanding that they were to be enforceable only in the event of
liquidation, failing which they were to be cancelled and returned to the
22. See note 13, supra.
23. The debtor in the instant case was receiving a salary of $2,000 a year. See
Agger, The Government and its Employees (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 1109, 1111, in which
it is stated that the average wage of the federal employee is $2,146 a year.
24. See Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago (1933) 42 YALE L. 3. 526, 551;
Hamilton, it re the Small Debtor (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 473; Sturges & Cooper, Credit
Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487, 513.
25. SELIGMAN, EcoNomics OF INSTALL-THENT SELLING (1925) 251, 260, 277.
26. Schwenk v. Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 562, 20 At. 259, 260 (1890).




maker as soon as improved business conditions permitted. Many institu-
tions went under, and the emergency notes were enforced and collected.' But
quite a few banks which participated in these transactions successfully weath-
ered the stormiest period. With the return of less troubled times, the rescue
paper remains in their portfolios. Proper disposition of these obligations poses
a difficult problem.
The status of the notes may be determined in several ways. The bank
might sue the maker in an attempt to enforce the obligation, but in the usual
case, the directors would be disinclined to take legal action against one of
their own number who came to the bank's assistance in its hour of need. A
friendly management would be strongly tempted to enter into an agreement
with the maker either to destroy the note or to set it aside as a dead asset,
despite the fear of a mismanagement suit brought by a dissenting stockholder.
Third, a director who no longer had a voice in the bank's affairs, and who
was fearful of action by the succeeding directorate, might attempt to have
his obligation cancelled in a court of equity. Since in the typical situation
the management is kindly disposed toward its benefactor, litigation has not
often ensued. But in a recent New York case, a succeeding directorate, badly
in need of funds, and in doubt as to the status of the obligations which it held,
placed the problem squarely before the courts.2
The notes in issue were transferred to the bank by its cashier at the
behest of the state banking official during the years 1930 and 1931. A reso-
lution of the board of directors that the obligations were to be delivered up
and cancelled as soon as the institution regained its stability was later incor-
porated into a formal written contract with the bank. With the advent of
the Banking Holiday in 1933, the institution closed its doors. At that time
all of the notes had been absorbed by capital impairment. Taking advantage
of the Robinson Act,3 the bank reopened in May, 1933, on a restricted basis,
freezing 40% of its deposits and issuing certificates of beneficial interest to
that amount. Permission to resume business was conditioned upon the dec-
tion of a new directorate, and the notes and securities which the former
directors had transferred to the bank were included in the schedule of assets
on the basis of which the Banking Department permitted the resumption of
operation. In 1936, the revitalized management attempted to enforce the
obligation in suit. In a declaratory judgment it was stated that while the
original donation was concededly and validly conditional, the maker was
estopped from asserting that defense after permitting the note to be treated
as an unconditional asset on the books of the bank.4 On motion for sum-
1. See, e.g., Vallely v. Devaney, 49 N. D. 1107, 194 N. NV. 903 (1923); Coast Nat.
Bank v. Bloom, 113 N. J. Law 597, 174 Ad. 576 (1934); State Bank v. Kirk, 216 Pa.
452, 65 At. 932 (1907); Williams v. Barringer, 158 S. E. 735 (S. C. 1931).
2. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank v. Ruth, 162 Misc. 82, 294 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup.
Ci 1937).
3. N. Y. BANKING LAw § 609.
4. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank v. Schmuck, N. Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County, Trial
Term, Part I, Oct. 26, 1936 (unreported). The court stated that ratification of the
agreement by the bank ex\aminer could in no wise affect the application of the estoppel,
and that insofar as it attempted to do so, the approval vas unauthorized. Cf. Broderick
v. Horvatt, 148 Misc. 731, 266 N. Y. Supp. 341 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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mary judgment, sympathy was expressed for the defendant, but judgment
rendered for the plaintiff.5 The court felt itself bound by the broad state-
ment of policy expressed by way of dictum in Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v
Bergoff.6 It was there stated that "public policy requires that a person who,
for the accommodation of the bank executes an instrument which is in form
a binding obligation, should be estopped from thcreafter asserting that the
instrument should not be enforced." 7
But the factual bases of the Mt. Vernon case and the instant situation are
essentially dissimilar. In the former, it was the opinion of the court that the
obligation was a fictitious asset procured by the bank to make possible the
deception of state banking officials. The maker was held chargeable with
knowledge of the bank's intent to deceive, and the principle of estoppel was
applied even though the deception was never effectuated. To this extent the
decision was an extension of the principle announced in an earlier New York
case8 which, consonant with the more generally accepted rule,' held that
where the maker actually knew of the intended fraud and the deception had
been put into practice, the obligation was enforceable in the hands of the
bank. That the principal case might well stand on a different footing is
readily apparent. The transaction therein was entirely open; the state bank-
ing official not only knew what was taking place, but played an active role in
procuring the transfer. The notes were not fictitious, but were conditional,
secondary obligations. They were not substituted for assets of the bank, but
were additional security for its liabilities. They were given to protect cred-
itors, not to defraud them. The Mt. Vernon decision, therefore, despite the
apparent finality of the principle there expressed, should not be conclusive
of liability in the instant situation.
It does not follow that the court in the principal case reached an improper
conclusion. The plaintiff bank, though still in operation, has by no means
,regained its stability. It has paid no dividends since 1931.10 At the time of
the instant suit, it had retired but 10% of the certificates of beneficial inter-
est."1 Thus it is apparent that recovery, the condition subsequent upon which
the notes were to be returned to their makers, had not occurred. The situa-
5. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank v. Ruth, 162 Misc. 82, 294 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
6. 272 N. Y. 192, 5 N. E. (2d) 196 (1936), (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 380, (1937)
6 FORDHAm L. Ray. 296, (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rv. 687, (1937) 14 N. Y. L. Q. Rv.
530, (1937) 4 U. OF CH. L. REv. 484.
7. Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N. Y. 192, 196, 5 N. E, (2d) 196, 197
(1936). Italics added.
8. Bay Parkway National Bank v. Shalom, 270 N. Y. 172, 200 N. E. 685 (1936),
(1936) 22 IowA L. REv. 156, (1936) 11 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 102.
9. The basis of the estoppel which is usually worked against the maker in these
cases is said by some courts to be the fraud in the collateral agreement stipulating im-
munity; by others to be the reliance of creditors and depositors on the misrepresentation,
Citizens Bank v. North End State Bank, 116 Kan. 303, 226 Pac. 998 (1924) ; Lincoln
Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209 Pac. 521 (1922); see BRANNAN, NEGOTiADmL
INsTRUMENTs LAw (6th ed. 1938) 454; (1929) 64 A. L. R. 595 and cases cited.
10. MooDY's MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS (1937) 675.
11. Memorandum for Plaintiff, p. 6, Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank v. Schmuck, N. Y.
Sup. Ct., Nassau County, Trial Term, Part I, Oct. 26, 1936 (unreportcd).
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tion in reality is closely akin to that in which unconditional obligations are
transferred to a bank to bolster assets-a situation in which the liability of
the maker is uniformly enforced.12 On all the facts, therefore, the actual
decision is probably not open to question.
But not all banks are similarly situated. Many, more fortunate than the
present plaintiff, have completely regained their solvency and are at present
in sound financial condition. If such an institution should attempt to sue
upon obligations similar to those enforced in the instant case, entirely differ-
ent considerations should govern. The validity of the application of the Mt.
Vernon case principle is by no means as dear. Yet the rule of the present
decision would, indiscriminately, prescribe absolute liability. Despite the
return of prosperity, the maker would probably be caught by the sweeping
Mt. Vernon dictum that a person "should be estopped from thereafter assert-
ing that the instrument should not be enforced."
Authority may be marshalled from other states to support the view that, if
a really prosperous bank were involved, a different result should be reached.
Although New York has decided to the contrary, a number of courts have
held that an instrument given to deceive examiners is not enforceable if the
bank is still solvent at the time of the suit.13 It would seem to follow as an
a fortiori proposition that in these jurisdictions the solvent bank could not
recover upon the facts of the hypothetical case.' 4 Nor is the problem com-
pletely devoid of direct precedent. In a strikingly similar situation, notes
were transferred to a bank at the instance of the examiner to eliminate an
expense account on the institution's books, and there was an agreement to
retire the obligations from receipts from the bank's earnings. The court, in
denying recovery on the notes,' 5 expressly distinguished those cases in which
deception of state officials was the object and those in which there was no
agreement for the bank to absorb the obligation when conditions permitted.' 0
12. Kopp v. Briggs, 198 Iowa 843, 200 N. NV. 422 (1924); Holland Banling Co.
v. Griggs, 323 Mo. 289, 19 S. IV. (2d) 290 (1929). See (1935) 95 A. L R. 534. How-
ever, an agreement to reimburse the maker need not be express, but may be implied
from the circumstances. Unconditional delivery of the note does not cut off the defense
of no consideration, but if the intent was the transfer of an asset, the court will find con-
sideration in the maker's interest in the bank.
13. First Nat. Bank v. Reed, 198 Cal. 252, 244 Pac. 368 (1926); First Nat. Bank
of Granite City v. Draper, 266 Ill. App. 579 (1932); see First Nat. Bank of Bowie v.
Chandler, 58 S. IV. (2d) 1056, 1057 (Tem. Civ. App. 1933) ; see cases cited in Bn ,,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 455.
14. At first glance the situation prevailing in Iowa would seem to militate against
this argument. That state has permitted cancellation, as against a solvent bank, of notes
given to deceive examiners. Smouse v. Waterloo Say. Bank, 198 Iowa 306, 199 N. NV.
350 (1924). Yet in Farmers Say. Bank of New Albin v. Bunge, 211 Iowa 1357, 231
N. IV. 651 (1930), recovery was permitted the bank on notes given by directors to pre-
vent impairment of capital at the instance of the state official, and accompanied by a
written agreement that the bank w.-as to deliver them up when its earnings permitted.
This apparent logical inconsistency is easily explained. An inquiry directed to the Iowa
Banking Department disclosed that the institution, though it brought suit in its owm
name, had been in receivership for two years before the date of the action.
15. Farmers' Bank of Conway v. Miller, 8 S. V. (2d) 92 (Mo. App. 1928).
16. See note 12, supra.
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Similarly, where a note stricken from the bank's list of assets by the exam-
iner was indorsed to permit its retention in the portfolio, recovery against
the indorser was denied in an action by the still solvent bank.17
The third alternative, that of a suit by the maker for cancellation, raises
identical legal considerations. The issues are so clearly the same that a New
York court would indubitably reduce the question to a determination of the
applicability of the Mt. Vernon case dictum. Similarly, those courts which
deny recovery to the solvent bank in the fictitious asset cases could be ex-
pected, again a fortiori, to permit cancellation provided they were convinced
the bank had regained a reasonable degree of stability., One state has
actually permitted cancellation in the fictitious asset case,1 finding no appar-
ent difficulty in the reversed positions of the parties.
Where the bank is again prosperous the balance would seem to be weight-
ed against the New York court's position.20 It is true that conditional assets
are being represented on the books of the bank to be unconditional, and in
theory depositors could rely upon that statement. This reliance is the ulti-
mate basis for the estoppel applied in the fictitious asset cases.21 But in the
hypothetical situation, any presumption of injurious reliance by creditors
would be completely rebutted by the fact of the bank's solvency. Creditors'
interests would be involved only in the remote contingency of future liquida-
tion, and immediate dissolution, rather than liquidation in the remote future,
,was the condition upon which the notes were delivered. Enforcement of the
obligation against the maker would then appear to be in the nature of a pen-
alty imposed for loyalty to the bank when its existence was in jeopardy. The
principle of the Mt. Vernon decision is probably sound public policy as
applied to the transaction there involved. But the attempt to sever that prin-
ciple and engraft it indiscriminately upon such a broad factual base might
17. Cripple Creek State Bank v. Rollestone, 70 Colo. 434, 202 Pac. 115 (1921). Cf.
First Nat. Bank of Bowie v. Chandler, 58 S. W. (2d) 1056 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
(recovery denied even where bank was insolvent, on ground note was for acconmoda-
tion and without consideration).
18. If, as in the principal case, the bank's position were still precarious, the condi-
tion extinguishing liability would not have occurred.
19. Smouse v. Waterloo Say. Bank, 198 Iowa 306, 199 N. W. 350 (1924). The notes
in issue were signed to cover an excessive line of credit in order to pass the bank exam-
iner's inspection. The maker was granted cancellation on the ground that the notes were
accommodation paper, and the bank, as the accommodated party, could not recover.
But cf. Farmers Say. Bank of New Albin v. Bunge, 211 Iowa 1357, 231 N. WV 651
(1930), discussed supra, note 14.
20. The numerous cases in which a receiver or superintendent of banking has been
permitted to enforce obligations of this kind (see cases cited supra note 1) should of
course have no bearing upon the result in a case where the bank is sound. If the action
is by a receiver, the condition subsequent of a return to normal must ex hypothesi not
have occurred.
21. See Leary v. Capitol Trust Co. of Schenectady, 238 App. Div. 661, 663, 265
N. Y. Supp. 856, 858 (3d Dep't 1933). The estoppel theory of liability is usually based
on the presumption of injurious reliance on the misrepresentation of assets. If the bank
sues in its own name, the presumption may be held to be overcome, or the bank may be
estopped from raising it. See (1935) 95 A. L. R. 534; (1924) 38 HAP.v, L. Rv. 239;
(1933) 27 ILL L. REv. 695; (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 666.
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well be branded as questionable therapy. The probable effect will be indi-
rectly to prejudice the depositor's position by discouraging personal assist-
ance by directors in future emergencies.
Critical analysis of the validity of judicial decisions does not, however,
determine the best course of action for the bank faced with this problem. In
the jurisdictions22 where, as against a solvent institution, a judgment for the
maker could be predicted with confidence, the solution is comparatively sim-
ple. A friendly suit by the bank or an action for cancellation by the maker
would set all doubts at rest. Or more simply still, the obligations could be
voluntarily destroyed by the bank, with no fear of a successful suit for mis-
management as a consequence. But in states which have not as yet indicated
any disposition toward the problem,23 the answer is by no means as clear.
Possibly the best course would be to compromise the claim for a few cents
on the dollar and then deliver up the note to the maker. If a suit for mis-
management of assets resulted, the principle could successfully be invoked
that directors may with impunity compromise any claim which as a matter
of law is of doubtful collectibility. 4 In New York, with present law settled
in favor of the maker's liability, such a procedure seems inadvisable. It is
possible that in a case in which the bank had regained financial security the
rule of the instant decision would not survive the more searching scrutiny of
an appellate court. But in view of the sweeping character of the dictum in
the Mt. Vernon case, reliance upon that possibility could hardly be recom-
mended.*2 5 The better course is probably for both parties to remain passive
in the matter, treating the obligations as "dead" assets, until the statutory
period within which the notes are actionable has run its course.20
22. See note 13, supra.
23. The argument that as an a fortiori proposition the court which does not hold
the maker in the fictitious asset cases will not permit recovery on a bona fide condi-
tional donation does not work in reverse. The numerous jurisdictions which enforce
liability upon notes given to deceive examiners may still logically decide either xway in
the case of a conditional note delivered in good faith.
24. Post v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 200 Fed. 918 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); Barton
v. Butler County Oil Co., 112 Kan. 436, 211 Pac. 608 (1922); see United States v.
Union Pac. R. R., 98 U. S. 569, 611 (1878); Venner v. Southern Pac. Co., 279 Fed.
832, 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); Burden v. Burden, 159 X. Y. 287, 307, 54 N. E. 17, 23
(1899).
25. There is no reasonable doubt as to the legal status of the notes in NXew York in
view of the Mt. Vernon case and the cases which have followed it. Westchester Trust
Co. v. Harrison, 249 App. Div. 828, 292 N. Y. Supp. 209 (2d Dep't 1937); Tarrytovn
Nat Bank and Trust Co. v. MacMahon, 250 App. Div. 739, 293 N. Y. Supp. 513 (2d
Dep't 1937); Aft. Vernon Trust Co. v. Oakwood Gardens, 254 App. Div. 6M6, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 532 (2d Dep't 1938).
26. The limitation on an action by the bank on the promissory note is six years.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48, Laurencelle v. Laurencelle, 217 App. Div. 159, 216 N. Y.
Supp. 384 (2d Dep't 1926); Sitomer v. Kimborofsky, 142 Misc. 514, 254 N.Y. Supp.
205 (N. Y. City Ct 1931). The limitation on an action by a stockholder against the
bank, however, is ten years. N. Y. Civ. Pic. Act § 53, Goldberg v. Berry, 231 App.
Div. 165, 247 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1st Dep't 1930); Clarke v. American Press Ass'n, 145
Misc. 370, 259 N. Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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One contingency may interfere with this apparently simple solution. A suit
might well be brought by recalcitrant stockholders for dissipation of assets.21
Here the running of the statute of limitations against the note would only
serve to strengthen the dissenter's case, for the argument that the directorate
was guilty of laches might then be adduced. If it be assumed that the posi-
tion that the notes were not enforceable would be discountenanced by the
court, about the only remaining defense would be to emphasize the equitable
nature of the directors' course of action.2 8 Demonstration to a court that
the directors were motivated by a sense of fair play in refraining from an
attempt to mulct the bank's benefactors might swing the balance in the man-
agement's favor. In any event, these theoretical obstacles should not be
permitted to override the natural reluctance of a now prosperous bank to
impose upon its directors a liability for which they never bargained.
USE OF CONFUSING BRAND NAMES BY STANDARD OIL COMPANIES
IN THE MARKETING OF GASOLINE*
THE adaptability of the oil industry to integration and large scale produc-
tion has encouraged many companies in the past decade to pursue the goal
of nationwide distribution. Perhaps more than in any other industry, profits
are directly proportional to the amount of the product marketed. Essential
in this competitive struggle for gallonage is the adoption of some unique
symbol or name to induce the consumer to choose a certain brand in prefer-
ence to others of almost identical quality. Millions must be expended in
popularizing such brand names by modern advertising methods. Whether or
not the advertised gasoline is nationally distributed, the typical channels of
modern advertising, such as magazine and radio, reach a nationwide audience.
And one incidental result of reaching the national market has been to reduce
unit advertising costs per gallon. The entrenched seller naturally desires
to protect his expensively acquired reputation against an expanding company's
use of a confusingly similar trade name or trade-mark. Such conflicts are
very apt to arise in the marketing of gasoline, for nearly a dozen of the major
companies trace their ancestry and their brand names back to the Standard
Oil Trust of 1911.
27. Stockholders might sue the directors either because of misrepresentation of the
financial condition of the bank, [Rives v. Bartlett, 156 App. Div. 552, 141 N. Y. Supp.
561 (1st Dep't 1913)] or because of negligent or unauthorized management of the assets
of the corporation. Bown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N. Y. Supp. 573 (4th
Dep't 1929).
28. It might be argued that the stockholders were estopped from bringing the suit
by their ratification of the original conditional contribution at the annual stockholders'
meeting. Cf. Goldberg v. Berry, 231 App. Div. 165, 247 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1st Dep't
1930). Subsequent purchasers of stock could not complain of the transaction. Pomeroy
v. Farmer's Sav. Bank, 203 Iowa 524, 211 N. W. 219 (1926); Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903).
*Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F. (2d) 1 (C. C.A. 8th, 1938).
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The Standard Oil Company (Indiana) has for many years marketed petro-
leum products in a group of midwestern states.' Through expenditure of
huge sums in advertising, consumers of this territory have come to identify
the terms "Standard Oil Co.," "Standard Oil," "Standard," "SOCO," and
"SO," with the Indiana company. Between 1926 and 1935, The Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey) marketed gasoline under the brand names
"ESSO" and "Essolene" in the east and south, but did not penetrate the
midwestern region. In 1935, however, Esso, Inc., a subsidiary of the New
Jersey Company,2 opened three service stations in St. Louis, Missouri, using
the colors red, white, and blue, which were also used on the Indiana company's
service stations and signs. At these stations "ESSO," "Essolube" and "Esso-
leum" were sold, but all signs and advertisements bore the added phrase
"Not connected with The Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)." In July, 1937, the
Indiana company, as plaintiff, sought to enjoin the use of such brand names
and colors by the New Jersey subsidiary in connection with the sale of petro-
leum products in the aforementioned territory on the grounds that such use
constituted unfair competition and an infringement of plaintiff's trade-marks.
It was successfully argued that "ESSO," derived from the letters S and 0,
which stand for Standard Oil, had caused confusion to consumers of these
states, where "Standard" had become identified with the Indiana Company.
An injunction was granted and the decree affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.3
The decision is unquestionably in accord with the established law of unfair
competition. Where a manufacturer adopts a trade name or trade-mark 4
similar to that used for similar goods marketed by another in the same area,
the senior user may enjoin the junior as long as the names or marks are
confusing.5 The intent in subsequent adoption is immaterial.6 Occasionally
an enterprise which starts outside the marketing territory of another chooses
a similar trade name or trade-mark for similar goods. Here the general rule
restricting the protection afforded the prior user to that area coterminous with
1. Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
2. The stock of Esso, Inc. is wholly owned by Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, whose stock in turn is wholly owned by Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey).
3. Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F. (2d) 1 C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
4. Protection of trade names and trade-marks rests upon identical principles.
HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TRADEmARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPErITIo.N (4th
ed. 1924) 12; Nlms, TH1E LAW OF UNFAIR ComPrrErox AND TAMs-MAnms (3d ed.
1929) 519.
5. The Coca-Cola Co. v. The Koke Co. of America, 254 U. S. 143 (1920); Rice
& Hutchins, Inc. v. Vera Shoe Co., Inc., 290 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Mantle
Lamp Co. of America v. Aladdin Mfg. Co., 78 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert.
denied, 296 U. S. 639 (1935); Standard Oil Co. v. Independent Oil Men of America,
30 F. (2d) 996 (App. D. C. 1929) (Registration of "Red Hat Gasoline" trade-mark
denied because of probable confusion with Indiana's "Red Crown") ; Standard Oil Co.
(New Jersey) v. Epley, 40 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. P. A. 1930) (Registration of "EPCO"
as trade-mark for gasoline to compete with "ESSO" prevented); Derby Oil Co. v.
White Star Refining Co., 62 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. P. A. 1933).
6. Nims, op. cit. supra note 4, at 879-910.
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his markets 7 has been relaxed only where the prior user might reasonably
be expected to enter the junior's territory through normal expansion of
business, and where the subsequent adoption was with inimical design.8 If
similar marks for similar goods are adopted in widely separated marketing
areas, and expansion by one or the other distributor, or both, brings these
goods into competition, the prior marketer in the disputed area is protected.
9
This result follows even though the senior distributor in the new territory is
the junior adopter, 10 unless the subsequent adoption was with inimical design
and in an area which the prior adopter was likely to penetrate."
The interesting aspect of the instant decision does not lie in its validity as
a legal principle, but rather in the economic history of the litigants. Standard
Oil Co. (New Jersey), parent company of the present defendant, and the
plaintiff Indiana company were organized as individual corporations by the
Standard Oil Interests in 1882 and 1889 respectively. 12 The plaintiff later
became one of the many subsidiaries of the New Jersey company. 1 3 But it
was not until after the dissolution of the Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) in
1911,' 4 when all the Standard subsidiaries were made independent companies,1"
7. General Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 90 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937);
Blue Goose Auto Service, Inc. v. Blue Goose Super Service Station, Inc., 110 N. J. Eq.
438, 160 Atl. 836 (1932).
"Into whatever markets the use of a trade-mark has extended, or its meaning has
become known, there will the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an
infringing use be entitled to protection and redress. But this is not to say that a pro-
prietor of a trade-mark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can monopolize
markets that his trade has never reached and where the mark signifies not his goods
but those of another." Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 415 (1910).
"There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to
an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed," United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918). These two cases, though
widely followed, have evoked considerable criticism as constituting a barrier to business
expansion. Goble, Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects (1927) 22 ILL. L. RLV.
379; (1937) 23 CORN. L. Q. 209; (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rrv. 408; (1925) 3 Tax. L.
REv. 300.
8. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926); Western Oil Refining Co. v. Jones, 27 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928). This
exception, founded in the very cases setting up the criticized doctrine of territorial
limitation (see note 7, supra), may well provide the legal means for furthering rather
than thwarting normal business expansion.
9. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916); Jacobs v. lodent
Chemical Co., 41 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) ; Southeastern Brewing Co. v. Black-
well, 80 F. (2d) 607 (C. C.A. 4th, 1935).
10. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918); General
Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F. (2d) 891 (C.C.A. 1st, 1925); A B C Stores, Inc. v.
T. S. Richey & Co., 266 S. W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
11. White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System of Eating Houses Corp.,
90 F. (2d) 67 (C. C.A. 6th, 1937).
12. Brief for Appellee, pp. 57, 58, Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F. (2d) I
(C.C.A. 8th, 1938).
13. See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 41-43 (1911).
14. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221*U. S. 1 (1911).
15. The decree forbade the New Jersey company, the parent, from exercising any
direct or indirect ownership or power over the subsidiary companies. These individual
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that many of the present characteristics of the industry assumed proportion.
Before 1911, the principal product of petroleum was kerosene; the by-product
gasoline.' 6 Not until about 1910, when the hitherto unpredictable automobile
created a growing demand for gasoline, was the first filling station erected T1
As the principal product of petroleum became gasoline rather than kerosene, 8
the four branches of the industry, production, transportation, refining and
marketing, underwent great modification. The growth of the marketing divi-
sion was rapid and haphazard, resulting in today's top-heavy structure.10
Yet in one respect marketing maintained pre-'dissolution characteristics. The
country had been divided into eleven districts. In each one distribution was
entrusted to a single Standard company20. which hardly ever sold beyond its
own boundaries.2 1 The boundaries usually followed state lines without regard
companies were further enjoined "from in any way conspiring or combining to violate
the [Sherman Anti-Trust] act or to monopolize . . ." and all agreements between the
subsidiary corporations . . . "tending to produce or bring about further violations of
the act . . ." were prohibited. Id. at 79.
16. REPORT OF MArKETING Divrsiox or PrOi.zEu ADmInISTnATivE BOAnD (U. S.
Dep't Int. 1936) 4.
17. "The automobilist of that period bought gasoline from bicycle shops, hardw-are,
grocery, paint, and drug stores, automobile and implement dealers, kerosene peddlers,
and other miscellaneous resellers.' Id. at 5.
18. In 1914 the demand in thousands of barrels for gasoline was 29,763, and for
kerosene 22,023. In 1925 the demand for gasoline was 226,329; for kerosene 39,969.
In 1935 the figures were 432,556 and 47,652 respectively. Id. at 4. This change in
emphasis was not due to the automobile alone. Tractors, marine motors, motorized con-
struction and industrial devices, and, later, airplanes all contributed to the development.
19. "Many of the processes of the oil industry are the result of scientific develop-
ment, but marketing, for the most part, is not characterized by scientific approach."
Id. at 3. For general discussion of marketing operations, see FED. TlRD Com.lassio.n:
PRICES, PROFITS, AND COMPETITION IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (SE.. Doe. No. 61,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 1928) 205. The rapid growth of the industry induced an over-
development of retail outlets, which has resulted in the present trend away from company
owned and operated stations. Companies are surrendering direct ownership and substi-
tuting leasing arrangements. Till, Gasoline, in HAMtmro., PRICE AND PRaIC POLICIS
(1938) 139.
20. (1) Standard Oil Co. of N. Y.: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. (2) Atlantic Refining Co.: Delaware and
Pennsylvania. (3) Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey): District of Columbia, Maryland,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. (4) Standard
Oil Co. (Ohio): Ohio. (5) Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) : Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin. (6)
Standard Oil Co. of Nebraska: Nebraska. (7) Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky: Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky and Mississippi. (8) Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana: Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Tennessee. (9) Magnolia Refining Co.: Oklahoma and Texas. (10)
Continental Oil Co.: Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
(11) Standard Oil Co. of California: Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and A, Wash-
ington. Fan. TRADE CommiSSioNx: op. cit. supra note 19, at 53. See Bus. WaM, May
25, 1935, 9-10. Actually at this time there were two small areas vhere there was slight
competition, namely, in parts of Arkansas where Magnolia did some tank wagon market-
ing in competition with the Louisiana company, and in northern Oklahoma between the
Indiana and Magnolia companies.
21. See Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 77 (1911).
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to economic efficiency. 22 This practice was continued after 1911 for several
years.23 First, it was feared that any inter-company competition would be
considered a collusive effort at predatory price-cutting, and dn attempt to
circumvent the decree.2 4 And secondly, the Supreme Court had ordered the
stock of the various Standard subsidiaries, which had been held by the parent
company, to be transferred to the stockholders of the parent,21 thereby placing
control of all Standard companies in the hands of a single group who were
naturally averse to inter-company rivalry.
26
But changes during the decade following dissolution motivated rather than
discouraged fence-jumping. Before the petroleum monopoly foundered on
the anti-trust laws, the great majority of the subsidiary companies were
devoted to only one branch of the industry.27 After separation these single-
branch companies pursued a course of integration to maintain their existence.
Marketing units purchased refineries; refineries merged with pipe line units;
and several companies achieved complete integration.2 8 These mergers, by
22. Establishment of territorial boundaries along state lines in many cases proved
unfair to the consumer. Transportation expenses were increased where boundaries were
unrelated to geographical features, and in many instances one company could have dis-
tributed beyond its boundaries more efficiently than the actual marketer. FED. TRADE
CommIssIoN: THE ADVANCE IN PRICE OF PErROLEUM PRODUCrS (H. R. Doc. No. 801,
66th Cong., 2d Sess. 1920) 52.
23. REPORT OF PETROLEUM ADrINIsTRATIVE BOARD, op. cit. sispra note 16, at 5.
24. "The active competition of two or more of them [Standard units] for business
in the same territory would have much the same effect on outside competition as the
combination between them to suppress competition, and might well create the suspicion
that this was its purpose." MAGUIRE, PRICES AND MARKETING PRACTICES (U. S. Fuel
Admin. 1919) 7.
25. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 78 (1911).
26. "By the terms of the decree, the stock of the component companies was trans-
ferred to the stockholders of the parent organization who now assumed direct control
of the constituents. Ownership and control ultimately remained in the hands of the
same group which had formerly exercised it." STOCKING, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND TIHE
COMPETITIVE SysTE= (1925) 54.
27. The New York and Indiana companies were merely marketers. FED. TRADE
COMMISSION: op. cit. mtpra note 19, at 264; REPORT OF THE: PETRoLEu ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 5.
28. This was accomplished in several ways. In addition to acquiring former inde-
pendents, the larger Standard companies swallowed up many smaller units of the old
monopoly. By the acquisition of controlling stock Standard of New York tool over
Magnolia; Standard of New Jersey took over the Standard companies of Kenltcky
and Louisiana and the Humble Oil Co. of Texas. By a trust agreement Indiana acquired
control of Pan-American Petroleum & Transport Co., both an operating and holding
company, one of whose subsidiaries is the American Oil Co. Finally, by merger, Con-
tinental Oil Co. and Mutual Oil Co. became one; Standard of California and the Pacific
Oil Co. united; and Standard of New York and Vacuum Oil Co., also a former unit of
the monopoly, joined forces. The last named move was not without legal opposition.
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 47 F. (2d) 288 (E. D. Mo. 1931); see
FD. TRADE CO MISSION: op. cit. supra note 19, at 83-98. Standard of New Jersey
and the California Standard were unable to reach agreement on merger negotiations.
Bus. WEEK, Sept. 9, 1931, 24.
increasing the amount of common stock of the various Standard companies,
diluted the control of the original group holding stock in all.20 One restraint
upon fence-jumping was in this way removed. During this period independent
gasoline companies had scattered filling stations throughout the Standard areas,
greatly decreasing the percentage of total business done by a given Standard
company in its territory3 At the same time, production of crude had greatly
increased, so that there was additional impetus to e-xpand. 31 The inroads of
competitors in the local territory made expansion beyond that territory in-
evitable if the vital volume of gallonage were to be maintained. The wide
range of the automobile, moreover, discouraged the maintenance of territorial
lines because wise business policy prompted supplying the goods to which a
consumer had been converted wherever he was likely to make demand a2
Independents, unrestricted by the decree, were adapting themselves to this
demand and were spreading out their costs by developing nationwide distri-
bution and increased gallonage.33 A final spur to inter-company competition
was the contention of many that only by this means could price discrepancies
in the different territories be removed and the comparatively uniform gasoline
prices of the pre-1911 era restored. 34
These circumstances were the initial causes of extra-territorial penetration
by Standard companies. By 1931 they had produced intense competition in
gasoline marketing.an New York State and New England, the home territory
of the Standard of New York, furnish a typical example of the competitive
growth. The start of invasion by other Standard units was made in 1916,
when Atlantic Refining Co. broke into this area, followed by the Standard
29. The merger of the Continental and the Mutual companies brought about a typical
result. "The merger of these interests so diluted the combined stock that a holder of
1% of the stock of the old Continental received only 1. of 1% of stock of the new
company." FED. TRADE Co-mmissioN: op. cit. mspra note 19, at 71. "Sales of their
holdings by former Standard stockholders, in whole or in part, transfers to institutions,
and the bringing in of new stockholders through the acquisition of independent companies
have, particularly in the last few years, greatly reduced the proportion of the stock-
holdings by identical stockholders in the various companies." Id. at 264-265.
30. A typical example is furnished by the statistics in the home territory of the
New York company. In 1909, it sold 92% of the gasoline marketed in its territory;
in 1918 between 55% and 60%l; 46% in 1926; and 35% in 1929. REixrD OF TiE Prrco-
I.aEur AD.m nuSAr= BoaD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 7-8.
31. Based upon an index number of 100 for 1909, the production of crude petroleum
increased to 258 in 1921, 304 in 1922, and 400 in 1923. FED. TRADE Co!.ilssro,: op. cit.
supra note 19, at 24.
32. "While any one automobile may not move within a very large radius, say, 100
miles or thereabouts, the multiple movement of numerous cars from the same area never-
theless has the effect of spreading consumer acceptance farther and farther from the point
at which such acceptance was initiated." REPORT OF THE PETROLEUM JAWDMI.ISTRATAT
BOARD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 8.
33. Some independents also achieved complete integration by stock control and
mergers. FED. TRADE Commissiox: op. cit. supra note 19, at 96. The Texas Corp. and
Royal-Dutch Shell, a foreign company, were the only marketers of gasoline in every
state of the Union in 1930. Bus. WEx, July 9, 1930, 9.
34. MAGUIRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 8-10; S'roci uN, op. cit. supra note 26, at 77.
35. REPORT OF THE PETRoLEum ADMIsTRATIvE BOARD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 12.
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of Indiana in 1925, Continental in 1927, and the Standard of New Jersey in
1929.36 A complete break-down of Standard marketing boundaries resulted.
The Indiana Company in 1935 distributed in the largest number of states,
forty-one, contrasted with ten in 1911. "Soconyland"3 7 had been extended
from seven states in 1911 to thirty-five in 1935, and New Jersey's marketing
area was expanded to embrace twenty more states during this period.3
The Standard companies' pursuit of nationwide distribution, however, was
opposed by legal obstacles that did not face the typical expanding manufac-
turer. The Standard name had gained an enviable reputation in nine of the
eleven territories in the decade following dissolution.39 This good will was
the product of advertising by the Standard marketer of that area. Within
each territory exclusive rights to the name "Standard" belonged to the
marketer of that region.40 Successful invasion of one Standard territory by
another Standard company therefore necessitated entry without the name
"Standard" and with a brand name that would produce no confusion. The
36. Id. at 7-8. Atlantic uses the brand name "White Flash ;" Indiana, distributing
through its subsidiary, the American Oil Co., uses "AMOCO;" Continental uses
"CONOCO;" and the New Jersey company in 1929 used "Beacon," marketed by its
subsidiary, Beacon Oil Co.
37. "Soconyland" is the name given to the region in which the New York company
distributed Socony products. As a means of popularizing this brand name, the company
distributed motorist's maps showing points where these products could be purchased.
Bus. WEK, Aug. 18, 1934, 22.
38. Bus. WExa, May 25, 1935, 9-10. These facts expressed in another form depict
the degree of extra-territorial penetration. The New York company distributes in eight
of the original eleven districts; the Indiana company in nine; New Jersey in six; and
Atlantic in four. But in each of these eleven territories the original Standard marketer
of the area supplies the greatest amount of gasoline, and in 1927 no Standard company
was the second largest seller of gasoline in the territory of any other Standard company.
FED. TRADE Commissi N: op. dt. supra note 19, at 225-228.
39. The Magnolia Refining Company in Texas and Oklahoma and the Continental
Oil Company in the Rocky Mountain district did not use the Standard name. But when
Magnolia became a subsidiary of the New York company, "Standard" products were
sold in its territory.
40. Standard Oil Co. v. Michie, 34 F. (2d) 802 (E. D. Mo. 1929) (Indiana company
granted injunction against competitor's use of "Standard Service Station"); Standard
Oil Co. of Maine, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 45 F. (2d) 309 (C, C, A. 1st,
1930) (New York company granted injunction to restrain a new competing company
from adopting "Standard" name for use in Maine). Not only do the Standard companies
have exclusive rights to that name in their own territories but also in the non-Standard
territories they were the first to penetrate. Standard Oil Co. of New Mexico, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co. of California, 56 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) (Injunction against
adoption by a new company of the Standard name in New Mexico, a Continental state,
penetrated by the California company); Standard Oil Co. of Colorado v. Standard Oil
Co. (Indiana), 72 F. (2d) 524 (C. C.A. 10th, 1934), cert. dcnied, 293 U. S. 620
(1934) (Injunction against use of Standard name by new competing company in Colorado,
a Continental territory penetrated by Indiana).
It was upon this basis that Indiana, in the instant case, was allowed the injunction
covering Colorado, Montana, Oklahoma 'and Wyoming, states in the Continental territory
in 1911. Since Continental does not use the "Standard" sign, Indiana was the first
marketer using the Standard name to penetrate these states.
Indiana Company penetrated eastern territories without legal opposition
through a subsidiary selling "AMOCO.' 4 1 But it is uneconomical to adver-
tise extensively to popularize two trade-names--one within the home territory
and another for extra-territorial distribution. The adoption of one brand
name for all purposes, abandoning the term "Standard," appears the wisest
business policy. Whether it was for such a purpose that the New Jersey
company adopted and started to market "ESSO" in 19264 is not apparent.
But all doubts were removed after the successful invasion of New York's
territory and the organization of Esso, Inc., in 1932, with the avowed intent
of attaining nationwide distribution. 43 The conclusion is compelling that
either the initial choice of the brand name or the later decision to make
"ESSO" a national product was a serious legal blunder. It was inevitable
that the term "ESSO," notwithstanding the precautionary device of "Not
connected with . . . "4 would create confusion and cause resort to the
courts in a territory retaining any derivative of the Standard name. The New
York company's adoption of "Mobilgas" for its national promotional cam-
paign seems to have been a far more sagacious choice.4"
ENFORCED INDEPENDENCE FOR MOTION PicTuRE EXHIMITORS*
THE battle of small independent competitors to ward off the forces of
merger and consolidation continues on many fronts. One struggle which
has recently attracted particular attention is that for control of the motion
picture theaters of the nation. For twenty years the motion picture industry
has witnessed constant integration of its three economic units: production,
distribution, and exhibition.' As a result of the acceleration of that process
41. See note 36, supra.
42. See Brief for Appellant, p. 11, Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 93 F. (2d) 1
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938). The adoption of "ESSO" by the New Jersey company may be
to some extent attributable to its acquisition of Ethyl, Inc. at this time. Contrary to
the general practice among gasoline companies, "ESSO," carrying the brand name, is
the premium gasoline containing "Ethyl," rather than the regular brand (Essolene).
43. This purpose had been intimated in advertisements and expressed in trade jour-
nals. See Bus. NV=Es, May 4, 1935, 16.
44. Explanatory phrases of this nature have only been upheld in cases involving
confusion of personal or descriptive names. To sustain such a device here would result
in the undermining of trade-mark and trade name protection. See Nnis, op. cit. mspra
note 4, at 100, 520; cf. R. H. Macy & Co. v. Colorado Clothing Mfg. Co., 63 F. (2d)
690 (C. C.A. 10th, 1934).
45. A national advertising campaign has been based upon this brand name without
the use of "Standard." Bus. WEEK, Aug. 18, 1934, 22.
*Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, et aL. 23 F. Supp. 890 (D. N. D. 1938).
1. When the First National Exhibitors' Circuit vas organized in 1917 by a group
of exhibitors who eventually made plans to produce motion pictures for display at their
own theaters, the producers, fearing loss of their markets, launched a tremendous cam-
paign of purchase, merger, and affiliation in which they announced their entry into the
field of exhibition. Lavis, THE Aforoy PIcruRE INDUSTRY (1933) 17-19; Petition of
United States, pp. 35, 39, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (Equity 87-273,
S. D. N. Y. 1938).
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during the last decade, eight companies completely dominate production and
distribution and exercise an increasing control in the field of exhibition.
2
Already the majority of the first-run and many of the subsequent-run theaters
in each of the key cities in the United States are favored by affiliation with
the large producing and distributing corporations.3 At the same time, because
their films have been released on license agreements and not by outright
sales, the major companies have been able to impose restrictive conditions
which set the independent exhibitors at a disadvantage in the competition
for profitable motion picture films.4 Aroused by this invasion of their field,
and smarting under the discriminatory tactics of the producers and distribu-
tors, the independents have attempted to translate their resentment into effec-
tive action, but so far without success.5 Use of the federal antitrust laws
against the major companies has been ineffectual, inasmuch as a conspiracy
in restraint of trade by two or more of the majors must be proved, and
possibly the restrictive conditions in the license agreements can be imposed by
several of the distributors acting independently of each other without serious
danger of violating the laws. 6 Equally ineffectual, up to date, has been the
attempted regulation of distribution by the states, for state enactments have
been held invalid as interfering with interstate commerce. 7
2. The number of theaters which are affiliated with producers is at present approxi-
mately 2500, out of a total of about 16,000 in the United States. Of the eight dominant
corporations, Paramount Pictures, Inc., Loew's, Inc., Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. have or are interested in
motion picture theaters, whereas Columbia Pictures Corp. and Universal Corp. are
engaged in production and distribution only. United Artists Corp. distributes motion
pictures made by various associated producers. Petition, supra note 1, p. 45 et seq.
3. A first-run theater is the initial exhibitor of a motion picture in a given area,
and the theater which regularly grosses the largest returns for that area. There may
be more than one such area in a city. See tables in Petition, supra note 1, pp. 63-69, 70.
4. The companies retain ownership of the films, leasing them on condition. Because
the eight major producers manufacture more than sixty-five per cent of all the feature
pictures exhibited by the theaters in the United States, each exhibitor is dependent upon
two or more of them for enough pictures to occupy his playing time. It is this dependence
which forces him to sign the unfavorable license agreements with the distributors. Typical
impositions of which the independents complain are: compulsory block-booking, i.e., blind
buying of a series of pictures before their production; forcing of short subjects and
newsreels; prohibitions of double-featuring; setting minimum admission prices; desig-
nating play dates; asking unduly large film rentals; fixing arbitrary and unreasonable
clearance and zoning schedules. For further examples see Petition, supra note 1, at 101-
107. In addition, the independent exhibitors claim that each producer-distributor favors
the other's theaters. This combination of circumstances makes it virtually impossible for
the independent to compete with the affiliated theaters.
5. See generally Comment (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 635.
6. Schubert Theater Players Co. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp., Fed.
Dist. Ct., (D. Minn. 1936); Rolsky v. Fox Midwest Theaters, Inc., Fed. Dist. Ct. (W.
D. Mo., 1936). But a Circuit Court upheld a finding of conspiracy inferred merely
from the uniformity in action of the defendants. Vitagraph v. Perelman, 95 F. (2d)
142 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) (on rehearing); cf. United States v. Interstate Circuit, 20 F.
Supp. 868 (N. D. Tex. 1937).
7. N. M. Laws 1933, c. 177, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v, Lamb,
Fed. Dist. Ct., (D. N. M. 1933); see also note 21, infra. But ef. R.K.O. Distributing
Because of the failure of the anti-trust sanction, and in order to circum-
vent judicial prohibition of the direct control of motion picture distribution,
the legislatures of several states have recently been persuaded to focus their
attention on the operation of motion picture theaters.8 One state, North
Dakota, prohibited the operation of any theater in which a "producer or dis-
tributor has any interest." 9 Paramount Pictures, the only producer-distributor
to come within the meaning of the statute, brought suit in a federal court to
enjoin its enforcement. In a per curiam opinion, the court denied the injunc-
tion and upheld the Act as a legitimate exercise of the police power to protect
the independent exhibitors in particular, and the public in general, from
possible monopoly. The existence of unusual power in the producers and
distributors to deal with competitors unfairly, when coupled with the oppor-
tunity and temptation to use that power toward effecting a monopoly of
theaters, was found to be a sufficient basis for legislative action.10
Usually statutes which are designed to foster local industry or to aid the
independent in his struggle with chain competition are drafted and upheld
as tax measures." The action of the North Dakota legislature represents a
bolder and more straightforward attempt to aid the independent, and the
opinion of the court reflects a refusal to regard as fatal the failure to follow
customary camouflages. But the court was perhaps needlessly courageous and
inviting reversal in its novel holding that the mere temptation to monopolize
was sufficient. This theory evolved from a finding that there was no actual
threat of monopoly or restraint in North Dakota, but, since a threat of
monopoly probably did exdst, the ruling could have been avoided. In the four
principal cities of the state there are sixteen theaters, ten of which were
operated by Paramount. 2 Though controlling only six per cent of all the
Corp. v. Bricker, (S. D. Ohio, 1938) where an Ohio Statute fixing play dates [Onio
GEN. CODE AN. (Page, Supp. 1936) §§ 13394-13394(4)] w.as held not to be an inter-
ference with interstate commerce though unconstitutional on other grounds. But the
California legislature was cautious not to include motion pictures in a statute [CAT.
GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8781, § 1] which prevented discrimination in articles
for general use or consumption.
8. N. D. Laws 1937, c. 165. Bills similar to the North Dakota Statute were intro-
duced in the legislatures of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana. In Indiana and
Minnesota they were passed in the lower houses by large majorities, but, as yet, have
not reached the upper houses.
9. N. D. Laws 1937, c. 165. For possible difficulties with the words "any interest,"
see note 12, infra. Section 3 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any motion picture
theater to be operated in this State which is owned, controlled, managed, or oparated,
in whole or in part, by any producer or distributor of motion picture films or in which
any such producer or distributor has any interest, direct or indirect, legal or equitable,
through stock ownership or otherwise." Affidavits of compliance must be filed. (§ 6).
Provisions are made for injunctive and criminal proceedings. (§ 7).
10. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890 (D. N. D. 1938).
11. E.g., State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527
(1931); Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 1 (1918); Singer Sewing Machine Co.
v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914); Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 (1934).
12. Because the interest of Paramount in these theaters was so obvious, the counrel
for Paramount apparently could not bring up the question of what effect was to be
given to the words, "any interest," in the statute. The statute makes it unlawful to
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theaters in North Dakota, Paramount had more than seventeen per cent
of their seating capacities, and more than seventy per cent of the total number
of seats in the cities in which it operated. The court was fully cognizant of
these facts and could easily have concluded that the menace of monopoly
existed not only on the national scene, but in North Dakota itself.13
Though it may be comparatively easy thus to uphold the statute under the
police powers of the State, it is more difficult to justify the casual conclusion
of the court that even if the Act burdened the flow of interstate commerce,
the burden was too incidental to warrant invalidation.14 Previous attempts
by the states to regulate distribution have been held improper for want of a
similar power over interstate commerce.' 5 The North Dakota statute makes
no express restriction on distribution or production, and ostensibly affects
only the operation of theaters, but its true object is evident from the manner
in which the statute was defended-as an act to prevent the abuses incidental
to the distribution and licensing of motion pictures.' 6 That state regulation
touches interstate commerce does not of course automatically render it invalid.
Thus, in Ohio, a federal district court held that an act preventing motion
picture distributors from fixing play dates placed no undue burden on inter-
state commerce, because it concerned only exhibitions in Ohio and was a
purely intrastate matter.17 In other states the seizure of films for purposes
of censorship has been upheld despite the obvious character of the interference
in interstate commerce.' 8 Further, although the principle has never been
extended to this particular situation, the failure of Congress to act has often
operate a theater in which a "producer or distributor has any interest." See note 9, supra.
A literal interpretation would mean, ironically, that a producer could close the doors
of a theater with which he did not desire to deal by simply purchasing one share of
its stock. However, it is likely that the not too serious difficulties presented by the
phrase will be overcome by liberal judicial interpretation.
13. The penchant of the court for the word temptation was probably the result of
its desire to be absolutely fair and impartial to the picture companies. But since it found
the power to monopolize, it could have found the threat.
14. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D. N. D. 1938).
The Court also found that any remote effect which the Act might have on the Copyright
Law [17 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1934)] would not sustain a conclusion that the North
Dakota Legislature had invaded a field exclusively reserved to the Congress of the
United States. The Act would seem to have no effect on the Copyright Law at all, for
whatever conditions are imposed on the exhibitors are permitted because the agreements
they sign are licenses and not sales.
15. See note 7, supra.
16. See Trial Memorandum of Plaintiff, pp. 68 et seq., Paramount Pictures, Inc.
v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890 (D. N. D. 1938).
17. The statute was held unconstitutional, however, because there were no standards
provided for its enforcement. The Act was intended to allow the local exhibitor to
make a proper choice of pictures for Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, when children
attend the theater in great numbers, but the Court decided that no standard of taste
was established, that it could not "assume that the local exhibitor would put aside
pecuniary considerations in the interests of the public morals to any greater extent than
the wholesale distributor." R.K.O. Distributing Corp. v. Bricker, Fed. Dist. Ct., (S. D.
Ohio, 1938).
18. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230 (1915).
been construed as a silent acquiescence in the action of a state legislature
intervening in the federal domain of interstate commerce.10 But where Con-
gress has acted the federal law is superior and the state statute is inopera-
tive.20 When a Wisconsin commission, acting under a general marketing
statute, attempted to regulate the distribution of motion picture films to theaters
in the state, a federal court held that the allegedly unfair trade practices
already were covered by general national legislation precluding the State's
concurrent power to regulate this interstate business.2 ' Such a decision
should not threaten the validity of the North Dakota statute insofar as it was
ostensibly concerned with an inherently intrastate problem, the ozwnership and
operation of theaters. The failure of Congress to come to the aid of the inde-
pendent motion picture exhibitor might well be said to have warranted the
effort of the North Dakota legislature to solve the problem within its bound-
aries. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has announced that a threat to
monopolize and restrain interstate trade is enough to sustain interference by
the Federal Government with intrastate trade. -2 2 The federal court in the
instant case simply applied the converse of the principle in permitting the
North Dakota legislature to interfere indirectly with certain activities in inter-
state commerce which threatened intrastate trade.
-2 3
But, despite the plethora of argument to support the princip,'d case, there
may be a fly in the independent exhibitor's ointment. The independent has
sought succor not only from the legislatures of the states, but also from the
Federal Government. Six days after the delivery of the opinion of the court
in the instant case, the Department of justice filed suit against the eight major
producers and distributors for violation of the Sherman Act, asking, in striking
parallel to the provisions of the North Dakota statute, that the defendants be
compelled to give up their ownership or interests in the theaters of the
19. It is said that where Congress is silent, local commercial regulations are valid
even though they bear directly on interstate commerce. As to police regulations, the
question turns on the seriousness of the interference. See NWILOUGHBY, COI:sruTiO:;AL.
LAw OF THE UNnT-a STATES (2d ed. 1930) 394; cf. GEnsTE=ER, AMracmc CoNsrnu-
TIOxAL LAw (1937) 128. For a history of the principle and its complications see Sholley,
Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause (1936) 3 U. OF CHL L. Rv. 556.
20. WILOUGHBY, CoNsmurioxAL LAw or THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1930) 394.
21. Paramount Publix v. Hill, 11 F. Supp. 478 (IV. D. Wis. 1932). Such regulation,
said the court, was "within the exclusive power of the federal government in the light
of the interstate commerce, the copyright, anti-trust, and Federal Trade Commission
laws of the United States."
22. If Congress deems practices, though not really a part of interstate commerce,
likely to obstruct, restrain, or burden interstate commerce, it has power to subject them
to national supervision and restraint. See United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 410 (1922); see also United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525,
542 (1913).
23. "A state legislature, for the purpose of shaping its laws and of guarding against
evils which have, or which it may reasonably believe have, developed elsewhere, may
look beyond the boundaries of its own state." Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer,
23 F. Supp. 890, 900 (D. N. D. 1938); see Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 427 (1937).
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nation.2 4 If in this suit the federal anti-trust laws are interpreted as repre-
senting Congress' treatment of the problems of the independent exhibitor
arising in interstate commerce, to the exclusion of any state legislation, then
operation of the North Dakota statute may become suspended. But to find
that the application of the federal anti-trust laws is exclusive, it will be
necessary first to find that the North Dakota Act interferes in interstate com-
merce. Here the independent exhibitor, in his anxiety for action, may stumble.
For when, in the suit under the federal anti-trust laws, the United States
asks that the defendants be compelled to give up their interests in the theaters
of the nation, it will probably argue against the holding in the principal case
and maintain that the operation of theaters is inseparable from interstate com-
merce. Should that argument be successful, the validity of state regulation
of operation would necessarily be once more drawn in question. Should the
argument fail, the victory of the North Dakota independent would be an empty
one for the independents of the nation, since what might have been accom-
plished in one deft stroke would then require the scattered sporadic legislation
of all the states. It is reasonable to hope, however, that courts will not permit
such a purely conceptual difficulty to hinder the efforts of the exhibitors to free
themselves from their state of extreme dependence. The escape is to be found
in considering the exhibition of motion pictures as among those activities
which are themselves intrastate commerce, but which at the same time bear
a direct and important relation to interstate commerce. Federal control in
these areas has of late become established as valid 25 but probably can not be
considered exclusive. Consequently both sovereigns may with propriety en-
gage concurrently in seeking the same ends.
But even assuming the resolution of all legal difficulties, the economic out-
look will remain far from bright. Whether the statute or the suit by the
Government, if it is successful, will materially aid the majority of the inde-
pendent exhibitors is problematical. Both merely distinguish between inde-
pendent and affiliated theaters. The disadvantages incidental to the self-
catering policies of the producer affiliates may be removed, but the difficulties
arising from independent circuit competition will still remain. To be specific,
when Paramount is excluded from North Dakota it is not unlikely that the
theater chain in which it was interested will be acquired by some independent
circuit, leaving to the small independent exhibitor a reincarnation of his woes
in the form of a further struggle against the high degree of bargaining power
that is vested in size .2  The statute should, however, at least dissipate the
domination of the seller competitor in the purchasing market. This measure
of achievement has accompanied the enactment in other states of similar
24. Petition of United States, p. 116, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
(Equity 87-273, S. D. N. Y. 1938).
25. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937) ; Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board, 95 F.
(2d) 390 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1221.
26. For example, from 1933 until 1937 the number of independent circuit theaters
increased from 3,189 to 3,910, with a parallel increase in seating capacity from 2,561,726
to 3,005,039. Petition, supra note 24, at 59.
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legislation aimed at preventing those who sell a commodity from competing
for consumer attention with those to whom they sell.2
If the independent ultimately finds that proceedings under either state or
federal laws will not elevate his bargaining position, he will still have two
other alternatives: intra-industrial arbitration or new federal legislation deal-
ing directly with and forbidding unfair discrimination in the distribution of
films. The prospect of relief under either method is not encouraging. Previ-
ous attempts at arbitration in the motion picture industry have not met with
noteworthy success, legal or otherwise,28 and prior efforts to elicit tile aid of
Congress have likewise been of little avail.29
Wholly apart from the possibility of improving the lot of the exhibitor group,
there is serious question as to whether a divorce of exhibition from production
and distribution will be of benefit to the industry as a whole. The present
pattern of planned production schedules and block-booking will probably con-
tinue unchanged. But the financial loss incident to readjustment of the in-
dustry's basic integrated structure may be larger than tie injuries inflicted
by the present system upon the independent. While the balance of equities
probably favors divorcement, predictions of success or failure in the solution
of the problems of a single industry will have little effect upon the current
anti-monopoly crusade and the zeal of nation and state alike to protect the
traditional small business man. In any case, until the federal anti-trust suit
against the eight major companies is decided, the police power of a state, if
the principal case is upheld, will have proved itself more effective in letting
free the flow of competition in a national industry than attempts to accomplish
the same end through previous anti-trust litigation. A victory for the North
Dakota statute in the Supreme Court may indicate that the sympathy of the
27. The State of Mississippi, for example, enacted a law to prevent corporations
engaged in the manufacture of cotton seed oil from operating cotton gins. Crescent
Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129 (1920). Grain warehousemen in Illinois
are forbidden from engaging in grain trading. Central Elevator Co. v. People, 174 Ill.
203, 51 N. E. 254 (1898). The Federal Government has also acted, for example, in
prohibiting carriers from transporting coal in which they have an interest. United States
v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909).
2& Arbitral Film Boards of Trade to hear disputes between exhibitors and distributors
provide a colorful part of the industry's history. Arbitration before the Boards was
made compulsory by the Standard Exhibition Contracts, and exhibitors were penalized
for refusal to arbitrate. Exhibitors complained that the Boards were tools of the pro-
ducers. See LEvis, MoTIoiN PicTurw INDUSTRY (1933) 262 et seq. Since it was part
and parcel of the aforementioned contract, compulsory arbitration w-as declared illegal
in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930). Said the
Court: "It may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of the motion-picture
industry; but when under the guise of arbitration, parties enter into unusual arrange-
ments which unreasonably suppress normal competition, their actions become illegal."
29. For recent attempts to secure Congressional action, see the hearings on legis-
lation to prevent block-booking and "blind-selling" in the leasing of motion picture
films. Hearings Before Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 30m2,
74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936) ; Hearings Before Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H. R. 6097, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934) ; see also the favorable report to
the Senate on the bill, SEN. REP. No. 2378, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
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Court is with the independent exhibitor, and so presage final victory in the
federal suit, but it may also mean that the Court believes the problem to
be essentially one for the states alone.
RIGHT OF CORPORATION TO PRACTICE MEDICINE*
EFFORTS to obtain adequate medical care at reasonable cost have stimulated
extensive experimentation with methods of medical organization.' The result
has been widespread development of such diversified types as private group
clinics, employee health associations, county physician bureaus, health insur-
ance plans, and medical co-operatives. 2 Many of the sponsors of these systems
have attempted to take advantage of the corporate form in order to achieve
limited liability and continuity of existence. Groups of physicians have in-
corporated to operate their own clinic; laymen have formed corporations,
hiring physicians to treat patients for profit; and aggregations of prospective
patients have organized non profit co-operative corporations.3 Yet the legal
existence of these corporate types has been jeopardized at one time or another
by attempted application of the principle that corporations may not practice
the learned professions. 4 Whatever the type of proceeding, whether quo
warranto,5 criminal prosecution, malpractice suit,7 mandamus action against
*Group Health Association v. Moor, U. S. District Ct., District of Columbia, July
27, 1938, in Equity No. 66392, 5 U. S. L. WEEK 1460; People cx rel. State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corporation, Inc., 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938).
1. See generally, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (Final Report of Com-
mittee on Costs of Medical Care, 1932) ; Levy and Mermin, Cooperative Medicine and
the Law (1938) 1 NAT. LAwYERs GuiLD Q. 194; (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1193.
2. MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1932) 74; Nw PLAteS OF MEDICAL
SERViCE (Julius Rosenwald Fund, 1936).
3. For a more detailed description of these plans, see Levy and Mermin, snpra
note 1, at 197.
4. This principle has been applied in many professional fields. Dentistry: Painless
Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932) ; Winberry
v. Hallihan, 361 Ill. 121, 197 N. E. 552 (1935) ; State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa
781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931); see Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244, 246,
60 N. E. 597 (1901). Law: In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15,
32 L. R. A. (N.s.) 56 (1910). See Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law (1936)
5 FORDHAM L. REV. 207; Comment (1934) 2 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 119. Medicine: In addi-
tion to citations passim infra, see Ops. Arr'y GEN. (N. Y. 1934) 240; Ops. ATrtV GEL.
(N. Y. 1935) 229 and 240; Comments (1936) 25 CALIF. L. REv, 91, (1937) 10 So, CALIF. L.
REV. 329. Optometry: Neill v. Gimbel Bros., 330 Pa. 213, 199 Atl. 178 (1938). See
Comment (1937) 11 TEMPLE L. Q. 232; but see (1936) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 118.
5. People v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157 (1936).
6. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E.
697 (1908).
7. Youngstown Park and Fall River St. Ry. Co. v. Kessler, 84 Ohio St. 74,
95 N. E. 509 (1911).
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a state insurance commissioner s or suit for declaratory judgment,0 the issue
has usually been framed in terms of the right of a corporation to engage in
the practice of medicine.' 0
Two recent cases, one in California and one in the District of Columbia, have
given the courts a fresh opportunity to consider the legality of both the profit
and non-profit type of corporation. In the California case, the attorney general
instituted quo warranto proceedings against a stock corporation organized
by laymen to operate for profit. For a fixed price the company sold contracts
which entitled the holder to medical services by designated physicians. The
company did not employ the physicians, but paid them according to the
services they performed. The court held that the activities of the defendant
constituted the unlawful practice of medicine. 1 An opposite result was reached
in the District of Columbia case. Here the Group Health Association, a non-
profit corporation organized by federal employees to provide medical service
on a moderate monthly payment basis, sought a declaratory judgment to
determine its legal status. The court distinguished the admittedly illegal
practice of medicine by a corporation from mere contracts to furnish the
services of physicians to members of the corporation, and reasoned that since
one person may contract in advance for the services of a physician over a
period of time, an incorporated group of persons may do likewise.'-
In this distinction between "practicing medicine" and "furnishing medical
services" lies the nub of the verbalistic conflict between the two opposing
points of view.13 While numerous state statutes directly forbid the corporate
practice of law,' 4 express prohibition of the corporate practice of medicine is
rare.'5 Instead, denial of the right of some corporations to practice medicine
has been based upon those statutes in every state which outlaw performance
of the healing art by unlicensed persons.'3 The obvious inability of a cor-
8. Benjamin Franklin Life Assurance Co. v. Mitchell, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 654,
58 P. (2d) 984 (1936).
9. Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Columbia, July 27, 1938,
In Equity No. 66392, 5 U. S. L. NVEnc 1460.
10. The necessity of complying with state insurance laws has also been raised, but
will not be discussed in this note. See Levy and fermin, sipra note 1, at 205.
11. People ex rel. State Board of Medical E.aminers v. Pacific Health Corporation,
Inc. 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938).
12. Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, U. S. Dist. Ct, Dist. of Columbia, July 27, 1938,
In Equity No. 66392, (1938) 5 U. S. L. ,VEEr 1460.
13. The following cases in addition to the Group Healthl Assn case have made a
similar distinction: State ex inf. Sager v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S. IV. 581 (1907) ;
State Electro-Medical Inst. v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N. IV. 1079 (1905); State
Electro-Medical Inst. v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. NV. 1078 (1905).
14. Typical statutes are ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 411; MAss.
GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 221, §46; N. Y. PENAL LAiw §280).
15. CAL. Bus. AND PROF. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 2007 (the term "professional"
relates to the art and science of medicine), § 2008 ["Corporations: Professional Rights.
Corporations and other artificial legal entities have no professional rights, privileges or
powers"' (Added by Stats. 1937, p. 1377)].
16. LAWS AND BoARD RULINGS REGULATING THE PRACriCE oF MEDICuE n:.- rE
UNITED STATES (Abstract published by American Medical Ass'n, 1925, containing in
convenient form the legislation pertaining to the practice of medicine in every state.)
1938]
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porate entity to meet the educational and character requirements prerequisite
to a license is said to inhibit a corporation from practicing medicine.17 To
bolster this interpretation of the statutes, courts have commonly resorted to
arguments of public policy.'8 Since the judiciary do not possess an intrinsic
power to regulate the medical profession as they do the legal,") the validity
of this viewpoint is necessarily dependent upon the soundness of the courts'
inference that state licensing statutes automatically forbid utilization of the
corporate power.
Courts which profess to deny all corporations the right to have any con-
nection with medical activities have apparently misconstrued the purpose of
the state licensing statutes. These statutes are designed to preserve the public
health by excluding from practice persons with inadequate ability, morality,
and training.20 Since the diagnosis and treatment of disease are obviously
purely personal functions, a corporation can perform them only through the
medium of doctors. But the mere fact that a corporation employs physicians,
or is operated by physicians, provides no valid basis for requiring the cor-
poration itself to be licensed. As long as the doctors are properly licensed
and their professional activities are not interfered with by unlicensed persons,
the purpose of the statutes is fully effected, for no one without proper quali-
fications is then directly or indirectly administering to the public.21 This is
true even though laymen may be entrusted with considerable control over
administrative details. 22 Only when lay officers or directors exercise sub-
stantial supervision over the professional activities of the physicians employed
is there ground for arguing that the corporation is enabling unlicensed persons
to practice medicine. 23 Thus the real issue is not whether corporations gener-
ally are unlicensed to practice medicine, but whether in each individual case
physicians are actually controlled in their purely professional functions by
unlicensed persons in such a manner as to nullify the purpose of the licensing
17. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d)
992 (1935); People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157 (1936);
Iterman v. Baker, 15 N.E. (2d) 365 (Ind. 1938).
18. Ibid.
19. Judicial power over the legal profession rests on the status of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273 (1882) ; People C.V rel. Ill.
State Bar Ass'n v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 474, 176 N. E. 901, 906
(1931). No basis for similar control over the medical profession has been elaimed.
20. LAWS AND BOARD RULINGS REGULATING THE PRACTIcE OF MEDICINE IN THlE
UNITED STATES, op. cit. sipra note 16..
21. The courts have recognized that the normal status of a physician employed by
one person to render medical service to another is that of an independent contractor,
responsible to his employer not for the manner but only the result of his services. South
Florida R. R. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638 (1893) ; Pearl v. West End St. Ry., 176
Mass. 177, 57 N. E. 339 (1900) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 223 (a) ; see Comment
(1938) 48 YALE L. J. 81.
22. For example, the hiring of general employees, fixing and collection of fees, and
preservation of records. See PRIVATE GROUP CLINICS (Publication of Committee on
Costs of Medical Care, Vol. 8, 1931) p. 117.
23. For example, attempts by laymen to prescribe methods or techniques of diagnosis
or to direct the mode of treatment.
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statutes. Without this pragmatic view, exemplified in the District of Columbia
case, no sound legal basis can be established for denying the right to furnish
medical service to some corporations while granting it to others. Even in
states following the California decision, numerous corporations engage un-
challenged in activities which have all the indicia of corporate practice of
medicine as defined by the same courts. It is common knowledge that private
hospitals, sanitariums, fraternal organizations, educational institutions, and
industrial concerns all administer medical services to their constituents through
staffs of physicians hired and paid on a full or part time basis.24 Similarly,
salaried physicians undertake part time contract practice on behalf of various
companies, particularly railroads, to treat passengers and employees.25 The
explanation for such discrimination may be that the social utility of these
types of corporate medical service has long been tacitly recognized; never-
theless, the fact remains that some corporate forms have been permitted in the
face of the same state licensing statutes which are so rigorously invoked
against others.2 6
Since the legal construction of state licensing statutes is by no means inex-
orable,27 their varying application to certain corporate forms is probably
attributable to the judges' evaluation of social policy arguments against
corporate medical practice. Impairment of the intimate doctor-patient relation-
ship and commercialization of the medical profession are the two general
social policy objections most commonly cited by the courts.28 The first evil
will result, it is feared, from possible restrictions upon the patient's freedom
of choice of physician and from a division of the physician's loyalty between
patient and corporate employer. If the old-fashioned family doctor is used
as the norm, this objection might assume serious proportions. But when the
challenged corporate forms are compared with the many types of corporate
medical service already accepted, any distinguishing basis must be fanciful
indeed. Furthermore, consistency would require that the same charge be
levelled against non-corporate forms such as county, municipal, and private
24. See People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429, 433 (Cal. 1938) (dissenting
opinion); GiuswoLD Axa SPICER, UmNI_.ErSM STUmEr HrALTri SuvwicEs (Publication of
Committee on Costs of Medical Care, Vol. 19, 1932); Nnv PLN.Ns oF .MfaIc,%L SElMcn
(Julius Rosenwald Fund, 1936).
25. MEDICAL CARE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS (Nat'l Industrial Conference Board,
1926) at p. 12.
26. People v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 II. 442, 200 N. M. 157 (1936). But
cf. PRIvATE GRoup CLIxics (Publication of Committee on Costs of Medical Care, Vol. 8,
1931) p. 20.
27. Some of these statutes, such as those requiring all members of a company render-
ing professional or skilled services to be licensed, have even been held unconstitutional.
Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928) (act requiring all members of a corporation
owning a drug store to be licensed pharmacists); State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79
Pac. 635 (1905) (statute requiring all persons who owned or managed a dental office
to be licensed).
2& People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429, 430 (Cal. 1938) ; People %. United
Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 455, 200 N. E. 157, 163 (1936).
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partnership clinics.29 And even if the choice of doctors should be unusually
restricted within a particular corporate scheme, many patients might prefer
that scheme to other types of private group medical services or to receiving
inadequate or no medical treatment whatsoever.30 As a matter of fact, how-
ever, this broad objection is made in disregard of the actual functionings of
many of the various plans, for the patient is commonly encouraged to select
one of the doctors on the organization's panel and thereafter consult him as
a family physician.31 Moreover, insulation of the doctor from administrative
and economic cares and elimination of the patient's concern over cost may
actually enhance the relationship between patient and physician.
2
More plausible is the second social objection to the corporate furnishing
of medical service. It is feared that the profession may be commercially
exploited by laymen who, not being amenable to ethical standards, are free to
engage in high pressure solicitation of patients and sharp competitive adver-
tising.83 But the fact that this fear may at times be well-grounded should not
justify resort to the drastic measure of barring corporate medical service
entirely. A more sensible solution is for the state to combine its recognized
regulatory powers over corporations3 4 and professions 5 in order to curb
objectionable professional activity.3 0 And even without special regulation, tile
state can undoubtedly hold contract physicians to the same standard of ethics
as private practitioners.3 7 Moreover, the opposition of the American Medical
Association to this type of corporate medical practice assures a zealous and
vigilant supervision by a body dutybound to report to the state injurious
professional activity.38
The legal and policy arguments treated in rather generalized terms above
can now be applied to concrete corporate situations, and distinctions may be
drawn among the various types of corporate activities whose legal existence
has been challenged before the courts. First, it is clear that a state would
have ample justification in regulating or dissolving a corporation, whether
29. For a description of various clinics, see PRIVATE GRouP CLINzcs (Publication of
Committee on Costs of Medical Care, Vol. 8, 1931); MILLS A-D GuiwD, Tur Ross-Loos
MEDIcAL GRoUP (Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, Misc. Contrib. No. 13, 1933).
30. Over one third of all the people in the United States receive inadequate or no
medical care whatsoever. REPoRT, NATIOxAL HEALTH CoNFERFxcE (July, 1938) p.i.
31. NEv PLzws op MEDICAL SERvicE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16.
32. MEDIcAL CARE FOR THE AMERICAN PEoPLE, op. cit. .supra note 1, at 194, 195
(Statement by Walton H. Hamilton).
33. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429, 430 (Cal. 1938); People v.
United Medical Service, Inc., 362 I1. 442, 455, 200 N. E. 157, 163 (1936).
34. 1 FLErCEER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 114.
35. The right of a state to regulate the practice of medicine by exercise of the police
power is well established. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889) ; Hawker v. New
York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898) ; Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581 (1926).
36. The Supreme Court has approved statutes prohibiting professional advertising
[Semler v. Oregon, 294 U. S. 608 (1935)] and solicitation [Williams v. Arkansas, 217
U. S. 79 (1910)].
37. Wormser, supra note 4, at 217 makes the same suggestion with respect to lawyers-
employees of a corporation.
38. See.(1938) 47 YaLE L. J. 1193, notes 7, 13, 14.
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profit or non-profit, whenever lay officers or directors exercise substantial
control over the professional functions of its physicians. A convenient legal
excuse might be that the corporation wds engaging in the unauthorized prac-
tice of medicine. But even those courts which have excoriated medical cor-
porations run for profit have recognized that non-profit, or co-operative, cor-
porations are much less likely to exploit the profession. 9 Hence when full
professional freedom is granted to its doctors by a non-profit corporation,
there appears to be no valid reason for excluding it from the medical field.
On this point both of the instant cases are seemingly in agreement. The
question becomes more difficult, however, when complete professional inde-
pendence is provided by a corporation organized for profit. In this case, the
legal requirements are also satisfied, but the likelihood of commercial abuses
is greater than in the non-profit type. Some courts persist in trying to solve
such cases by repeating generalizations which are meaningless in the abstract.
A more realistic judicial approach would disregard the corporate form as
such and inquire ihstead whether the actual setup is so provocative of abuses
that the only solution is to deny the corporation existence altogether. However,
the public interest in furthering experiments in medical care may suffer much
by trusting to haphazard decisions by tribunals ill-fitted to investigate intricate
specific cases. The surer method of achieving the benefits of corporate medical
organization without possible attendant evils would be by enactment of legis-
lation specifically authorizing the corporate form but carefully regulating its
activities so as to insure the highest response to professional ethics by the
corporation as an entity and by its physicians.
39. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P. (2d) 429, 431 (Cal. 1938).
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